U.S. federal electricity regulators have scheduled technical conferences for this autumn to discuss issues related to two major policy initiatives: carbon pricing in organized wholesale electricity markets, and offshore wind integration in regional transmission organizations and independent system operators (RTOs/ISOs). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's scheduling of two technical conferences on these topics signals its interest in exploring the interplay between state energy and environmental policies and federally jurisdictional markets.
One technical conference regarding Carbon Pricing in Organized Wholesale Electricity Markets (Docket No. AD20-14-000)
will be held on September 30, 2020, "to discuss considerations related
to state adoption of mechanisms to price carbon dioxide emissions,
commonly referred to as carbon pricing, in regions with
Commission-jurisdictional organized wholesale electricity markets." The case has its genesis in a request for such an event, filed on April 13, 2020, by a broad coalition including Advanced Energy Economy, the American Council on Renewable Energy, the American Wind Energy Association, Brookfield Renewable, Calpine Corporation, Competitive Power Ventures, Inc., the Electric Power Supply Association, the Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc., LS Power Associates, L.P., the Natural Gas Supply Association, NextEra Energy, Inc., PJM Power Providers Group, R Street Institute, and Vistra Energy Corp. A number of other utilities, RTOs, and state interests also expressed support, prior to the Commission's issuance of a public notice on June 17 scheduling the event.
Another technical conference regarding Offshore Wind Integration in RTOs/ISOs (Docket No. AD20-18-000), to be held October 27, 2020, will be convened "to discuss whether existing Commission transmission, interconnection, and merchant transmission facility frameworks in RTOs/ISOs can accommodate anticipated growth in offshore wind generation in an efficient and effective manner that safeguards open access transmission principles and to consider possible changes or improvements to the current framework should they be needed to accommodate such growth."
Beyond the fact that the Commission issued notices of both technical conferences on June 17, 2020, the proceedings also share a common focus on the effects of state energy and environmental policies on federally-jurisdictional activities. For now, the prevailing carbon pricing mechanisms -- such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative adopted by many northeastern states -- and the strongest policies favoring or requiring offshore wind development are arising as a matter of state law and policy, as opposed to federal law.
The boundaries between federal and state jurisdiction are viewed by many as long-settled, although a series of federal court and agency decisions have found specific state electricity procurement and subsidy laws to be preempted by federal regulation, and a case pending before the Commission asks it to find that most state net metering programs are preempted by federal law. Whether the Commission grants or denies the pending request, the June 17 notices of technical conferences on carbon pricing and offshore wind integration suggest continued federal interest in exploring the implications of state policies on FERC-jurisdictional markets.
Showing posts with label wholesale. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wholesale. Show all posts
FERC sets carbon pricing and offshore wind tech conferences
Thursday, June 18, 2020
NECPUC 2018 energy symposium
Monday, May 21, 2018
New England utility regulators have gathered in Maine for the 71st annual symposium of the New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners.
NECPUC is a non-profit corporation which provides regional regulatory assistance on matters of common concern to public utilities commissions of the six New England states. Its board of directors is composed of public utilities commissioners from the six New England states. NECPUC meets regularly throughout the year and sponsors an annual symposium on regulatory issues.
NECPUC holds its 71st annual symposium in Cape Neddick, Maine, from May 20-23, 2018. The agenda for the 2018 NECPUC event includes programs focused on topics affecting the New England utility landscape. For the energy sector, these include a plenary session on wholesale markets and how consumers are impacted by "reliability-centric market challenges," as well as a panel on advancing electric vehicle infrastructure in New England. Another set of panels focuses on how to analyze, regulate, and manage risks of high-impact, low-frequency events like cybersecurity attacks or extreme weather. Other panels cover water, telecommunications, and natural gas topics.
Speakers scheduled to appear include Maine Governor Paul LePage and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Commissioner Robert Powelson, as well as commissioners from numerous state public utilities commissions.
NECPUC is a non-profit corporation which provides regional regulatory assistance on matters of common concern to public utilities commissions of the six New England states. Its board of directors is composed of public utilities commissioners from the six New England states. NECPUC meets regularly throughout the year and sponsors an annual symposium on regulatory issues.
NECPUC holds its 71st annual symposium in Cape Neddick, Maine, from May 20-23, 2018. The agenda for the 2018 NECPUC event includes programs focused on topics affecting the New England utility landscape. For the energy sector, these include a plenary session on wholesale markets and how consumers are impacted by "reliability-centric market challenges," as well as a panel on advancing electric vehicle infrastructure in New England. Another set of panels focuses on how to analyze, regulate, and manage risks of high-impact, low-frequency events like cybersecurity attacks or extreme weather. Other panels cover water, telecommunications, and natural gas topics.
Speakers scheduled to appear include Maine Governor Paul LePage and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Commissioner Robert Powelson, as well as commissioners from numerous state public utilities commissions.
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ISO-NE files 12th capacity auction results
Monday, March 12, 2018
The organization responsible for New England's wholesale electricity markets has announced the results of its twelfth annual forward capacity auction. According to grid operator ISO New England, Inc., its FCA 12 concluded with sufficient resources to meet electricity demand in 2021-2022, at the lowest price in five years.
As in some (but not all) other organized electricity markets, New England's electricity market design includes a wholesale energy market as well as a forward capacity market. Operated by ISO New England, the Forward Capacity Market or FCM is designed to secure capacity resources sufficient to meet future demand. The capacity market is separate from the energy market, and can provide additional revenues for qualified resources.
The grid operator conducts annual Forward Capacity Auctions or FCAs, held three years in advance of each one-year operating period. Generation and other capacity resources such as load management or energy efficiency can compete in these auctions to obtain monthly market-priced capacity payments during the delivery year, in exchange for the obligation to supply capacity -- and supply energy or curtail demand when dispatched by the ISO in that future period. Capacity revenues can support the development of new resources as well as the retention of existing plants by providing predictable cash flows and incentivizing consistent resource availability.
ISO New England held its twelfth FCA on February 5 and 6, 2018, auctioning off capacity supply obligations for the capacity commitment period of June 1, 2021 through May 31, 2022. On February 28, 2018, ISO New England submitted its forward capacity auction results filing for FCA12 to the Commission. According to the filing, the descending clock auction commenced with a starting price of $12.684/kW-month, with resources in most zones to be paid at a clearing price of $4.631/kW-month based on the system sloped demand curve. About 1,100 megawatts of imports over certain interfaces with Canada will be paid at reduced capacity clearing prices. These prices are all below recent ISO-NE forward capacity auction results.
Through FCA12, ISO-NE procured 30,011 megawatts of generation, including 174 megawatts of new generation. The auction also acquired about 3,600 megawatts of energy efficiency and demand-reduction measures, 514 megawatts of which is new. The grid operator estimated the total cost of the capacity market in 2021-2022 to be approximately $2.07 billion.
ISO noted that it had rejected two "de-list bids", or requests by existing generators to leave the capacity market, for local reliability reasons. It identified those bids as coming from Exelon Generation Company, LLC with respect to its Mystic 7 and 8 units, totaling about 1,278 megawatts. As described in supporting testimony, ISO asserted that "allowing the resources to leave the market would have resulted in a violation of NERC, NPCC, or ISO criteria." According to a related press release, ISO found that "transmission lines in Greater Boston could be overloaded if Mystic 7 and Mystic 8 were not available during 2021-2022."
ISO described the results of the auction as just and reasonable, and asked the Commission to accept the filing.
As in some (but not all) other organized electricity markets, New England's electricity market design includes a wholesale energy market as well as a forward capacity market. Operated by ISO New England, the Forward Capacity Market or FCM is designed to secure capacity resources sufficient to meet future demand. The capacity market is separate from the energy market, and can provide additional revenues for qualified resources.
The grid operator conducts annual Forward Capacity Auctions or FCAs, held three years in advance of each one-year operating period. Generation and other capacity resources such as load management or energy efficiency can compete in these auctions to obtain monthly market-priced capacity payments during the delivery year, in exchange for the obligation to supply capacity -- and supply energy or curtail demand when dispatched by the ISO in that future period. Capacity revenues can support the development of new resources as well as the retention of existing plants by providing predictable cash flows and incentivizing consistent resource availability.
ISO New England held its twelfth FCA on February 5 and 6, 2018, auctioning off capacity supply obligations for the capacity commitment period of June 1, 2021 through May 31, 2022. On February 28, 2018, ISO New England submitted its forward capacity auction results filing for FCA12 to the Commission. According to the filing, the descending clock auction commenced with a starting price of $12.684/kW-month, with resources in most zones to be paid at a clearing price of $4.631/kW-month based on the system sloped demand curve. About 1,100 megawatts of imports over certain interfaces with Canada will be paid at reduced capacity clearing prices. These prices are all below recent ISO-NE forward capacity auction results.
Through FCA12, ISO-NE procured 30,011 megawatts of generation, including 174 megawatts of new generation. The auction also acquired about 3,600 megawatts of energy efficiency and demand-reduction measures, 514 megawatts of which is new. The grid operator estimated the total cost of the capacity market in 2021-2022 to be approximately $2.07 billion.
ISO noted that it had rejected two "de-list bids", or requests by existing generators to leave the capacity market, for local reliability reasons. It identified those bids as coming from Exelon Generation Company, LLC with respect to its Mystic 7 and 8 units, totaling about 1,278 megawatts. As described in supporting testimony, ISO asserted that "allowing the resources to leave the market would have resulted in a violation of NERC, NPCC, or ISO criteria." According to a related press release, ISO found that "transmission lines in Greater Boston could be overloaded if Mystic 7 and Mystic 8 were not available during 2021-2022."
ISO described the results of the auction as just and reasonable, and asked the Commission to accept the filing.
Report: 50 GW US electric storage potential
Thursday, March 1, 2018
A recently adopted federal regulation aimed at helping electric storage resources participate in wholesale electricity markets could unlock 7,000 megawatts of storage potential -- or up to 50,000 megawatts if all benefits can be captured through state and federal action -- according to a report by consulting firm The Brattle Group.
The study is titled, “Getting to 50 GW? The Role of FERC Order 841, RTOs, States, and Utilities in Unlocking Storage’s Potential.” Released on February 22, 2018, the report concludes that electric storage market potential could grow to 50,000 MW within the next ten years, if storage costs continue to decline and state and federal regulatory policies continue to be supportive.
The Brattle report comes one week after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's issuance of Order No. 841, a final rule aimed at removing barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in wholesale markets operated by regional transmission organization and independent system operators. The Brattle report describes Order 841 as "an important step in unlocking the value in wholesale energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets," noting the consulting firm's finding that at least half of storage's total possible value can be achieved in wholesale electricity markets.
Crucially, the Brattle study finds that fully realizing the value of electric storage will require state policy reforms similar to those at the federal level. Generally speaking, wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission are subject to federal jurisdiction, while retail sales and local distribution are subject to state jurisdiction. This split jurisdiction means that some value streams available through battery storage can be only captured at the state level -- for example benefits from deferring or avoiding investments in transmission and distribution infrastructure by using storage as a non-transmission alternative, or customer benefits like increased reliability and engagement with power supply.
Storage can also save customers money -- as noted in the report, avoiding retail rate demand changes is one of the primary business drivers for storage deployment by U.S. commercial and industrial customers. But these values can only be fully captured through state action to remove the barriers that remain.
Some states are acting to incentivize or require energy storage investments. California set a mandate of 1,325 megawatts of storage by 2020, and Oregon and Massachusetts have also set state storage mandates.
The report also covers implications for existing storage resources, most of which are hydropower. It finds that existing storage resources can provide substantial new capabilities, if they can be operated more flexibly than today. As noted in the report, "Increasing flexibility of existing hydro can be very valuable, reducing the need for new investments." The report also suggests that optimizing operating strategies could increase storage revenues by 2 to 5 times.
The study is titled, “Getting to 50 GW? The Role of FERC Order 841, RTOs, States, and Utilities in Unlocking Storage’s Potential.” Released on February 22, 2018, the report concludes that electric storage market potential could grow to 50,000 MW within the next ten years, if storage costs continue to decline and state and federal regulatory policies continue to be supportive.
The Brattle report comes one week after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's issuance of Order No. 841, a final rule aimed at removing barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in wholesale markets operated by regional transmission organization and independent system operators. The Brattle report describes Order 841 as "an important step in unlocking the value in wholesale energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets," noting the consulting firm's finding that at least half of storage's total possible value can be achieved in wholesale electricity markets.
Crucially, the Brattle study finds that fully realizing the value of electric storage will require state policy reforms similar to those at the federal level. Generally speaking, wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission are subject to federal jurisdiction, while retail sales and local distribution are subject to state jurisdiction. This split jurisdiction means that some value streams available through battery storage can be only captured at the state level -- for example benefits from deferring or avoiding investments in transmission and distribution infrastructure by using storage as a non-transmission alternative, or customer benefits like increased reliability and engagement with power supply.
Storage can also save customers money -- as noted in the report, avoiding retail rate demand changes is one of the primary business drivers for storage deployment by U.S. commercial and industrial customers. But these values can only be fully captured through state action to remove the barriers that remain.
Some states are acting to incentivize or require energy storage investments. California set a mandate of 1,325 megawatts of storage by 2020, and Oregon and Massachusetts have also set state storage mandates.
The report also covers implications for existing storage resources, most of which are hydropower. It finds that existing storage resources can provide substantial new capabilities, if they can be operated more flexibly than today. As noted in the report, "Increasing flexibility of existing hydro can be very valuable, reducing the need for new investments." The report also suggests that optimizing operating strategies could increase storage revenues by 2 to 5 times.
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FERC Order 841 and electric storage markets
Monday, February 19, 2018
U.S. energy regulators have issued a final rule designed to help electric storage resources participate in the capacity, energy and ancillary services markets operated by regional grid operators. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission said its Order No. 841 would remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in wholesale markets operated by regional transmission organization and independent system operators.
Electricity storage technologies have been around for some time, and some technologies like pumped hydropower storage have been deployed on a significant scale -- but new electric technologies are developing on top of these traditional technologies. New England's regional grid operator recently cited fast-responding energy storage devices as among the new technologies entering its markets. Many states have recognized the opportunities created by storage, and are enacting incentives to support its development and integration into microgrids. At the same time, regulators are grappling with how to fit energy storage resources into existing markets and incentive programs, like retail net metering.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has considered electric storage for some time, including stakeholder workshops, data requests, and technical conferences. The Commission expressed concerns that barriers to electric storage resources participation in organized wholesale markets could lead to unjust and unreasonable wholesale electricity rates. In November 2016, the Commission proposed a rule to facilitate electric storage resources' participation in organized wholesale markets. In January 2017, the Commission issued a policy statement addressing how electric storage resources may provide services at a mix of cost-based and market-based rates.
In issuing Order No. 841 on February 15, 2018, the Commission adopted a final rule requiring each RTO and ISO to revise its tariff to establish a "participation model" for electric storage resources. As envisioned by the Commission, these participation models will consist of market rules that facilitate electric storage resources' participation in organized wholesale markets, while recognizing storage resources' physical and operational characteristics.
The new rule provides that each RTO and ISO must adopt its own participation model for electric storage resources, within certain guidelines. First, the participation model must ensure that storage resources using it are eligible to provide all capacity, energy, and ancillary services they are technically capable of providing. Second, the participation model must ensure that participating storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and wholesale buyer, consistent with rules that govern the conditions under which a resource can set the wholesale price. Third, the participation model must account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources through bidding parameters or other means Fourth, it must a minimum size requirement for participation in the RTO and ISO markets that does not exceed 100 kW.
The rule also requires that the sale of electric energy from the RTO or ISO market to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale locational marginal price.
In an accompanying statement, Commissioner LaFleur described electric storage as "like a 'Swiss army knife' that can serve customers in multiple ways," including including providing energy, particularly in conjunction with variable renewable generation (example: Deepwater Wind has proposed offshore wind plus storage in response to the pending Massachusetts offshore wind solicitation) as well as providing frequency regulation and other ancillary services, and helping defer distribution and transmission needs. Commissioner Powelson noted its consistency with the Commission's "longstanding commitment to fostering innovation and competition by reducing and eliminating barriers to entry." Commissioner Glick said Order No. 841 "will facilitate the development of a class of technologies—ranging from batteries to pumped hydro—that has the potential to play a leading role in the transition to the electricity system of the future, but that has heretofore been hindered by market rules that were designed primarily to accommodate more conventional means of electric generation."
Once it takes effect, the final rule gives RTOs and ISOs 270 days to develop and file their proposed rule changes, and a year for their implementation.
Electricity storage technologies have been around for some time, and some technologies like pumped hydropower storage have been deployed on a significant scale -- but new electric technologies are developing on top of these traditional technologies. New England's regional grid operator recently cited fast-responding energy storage devices as among the new technologies entering its markets. Many states have recognized the opportunities created by storage, and are enacting incentives to support its development and integration into microgrids. At the same time, regulators are grappling with how to fit energy storage resources into existing markets and incentive programs, like retail net metering.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has considered electric storage for some time, including stakeholder workshops, data requests, and technical conferences. The Commission expressed concerns that barriers to electric storage resources participation in organized wholesale markets could lead to unjust and unreasonable wholesale electricity rates. In November 2016, the Commission proposed a rule to facilitate electric storage resources' participation in organized wholesale markets. In January 2017, the Commission issued a policy statement addressing how electric storage resources may provide services at a mix of cost-based and market-based rates.
In issuing Order No. 841 on February 15, 2018, the Commission adopted a final rule requiring each RTO and ISO to revise its tariff to establish a "participation model" for electric storage resources. As envisioned by the Commission, these participation models will consist of market rules that facilitate electric storage resources' participation in organized wholesale markets, while recognizing storage resources' physical and operational characteristics.
The new rule provides that each RTO and ISO must adopt its own participation model for electric storage resources, within certain guidelines. First, the participation model must ensure that storage resources using it are eligible to provide all capacity, energy, and ancillary services they are technically capable of providing. Second, the participation model must ensure that participating storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and wholesale buyer, consistent with rules that govern the conditions under which a resource can set the wholesale price. Third, the participation model must account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources through bidding parameters or other means Fourth, it must a minimum size requirement for participation in the RTO and ISO markets that does not exceed 100 kW.
The rule also requires that the sale of electric energy from the RTO or ISO market to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale locational marginal price.
In an accompanying statement, Commissioner LaFleur described electric storage as "like a 'Swiss army knife' that can serve customers in multiple ways," including including providing energy, particularly in conjunction with variable renewable generation (example: Deepwater Wind has proposed offshore wind plus storage in response to the pending Massachusetts offshore wind solicitation) as well as providing frequency regulation and other ancillary services, and helping defer distribution and transmission needs. Commissioner Powelson noted its consistency with the Commission's "longstanding commitment to fostering innovation and competition by reducing and eliminating barriers to entry." Commissioner Glick said Order No. 841 "will facilitate the development of a class of technologies—ranging from batteries to pumped hydro—that has the potential to play a leading role in the transition to the electricity system of the future, but that has heretofore been hindered by market rules that were designed primarily to accommodate more conventional means of electric generation."
Once it takes effect, the final rule gives RTOs and ISOs 270 days to develop and file their proposed rule changes, and a year for their implementation.
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ISO-NE 2018 Regional Electricity Outlook
Thursday, February 15, 2018
Regional electricity grid operator ISO New England, Inc. has released its 2018 Regional Electricity Outlook. According to the report, "the biggest challenge to the
reliability of the grid is the lack of fuel infrastructure to supply the fleet of natural-gas-fired generators,
further emission restrictions on oil-fired generation, and the reality that older oil and nuclear generators
are becoming less economically competitive and may retire before the region has added sufficient new
energy sources to replace them."
The report cites competitive forces has having "unleashed new approaches for producing electricity in a cleaner way and integrating technology that enables different types of resources to participate in the wholesale markets." It notes new resource types entering the wholesale market, including demand resources, and fast-responding energy storage devices.
With respect to energy supply, the 2018 outlook notes that the amount of wind and solar power in New England continues to grow "and is making a difference in how the ISO operates the power system and designs the wholesale markets." In 2017, the amount of new wind power seeking interconnection in New England surpassed proposed new natural-gas-fired generation for the first time, including significant amounts in Maine and offshore of Massachusetts.
On the demand side, it notes that significant investments in solar resources and energy-efficiency measures have moderated demand for wholesale electricity, but that electrifying the transportation and heating sectors to reduce their carbon emissions could lead to increased demand.
ISO-NE has previously identified the risk that power plants will run out of fuel as the foremost challenge to a reliable power grid in New England. Last month, ISO-NE released an operational fuel security study analyzing fuel security risks facing region's power plants under a wide range of hypothetical future scenarios. That report concluded that maintaining the electric grid's reliability "is likely to become more challenging, especially if current power system trends continue."
The 2018 Regional Electricity Outlook notes that while ISO-NE plays a role in addressing regional fuel-delivery constraints, "it will be up to market participants and state officials to take actions to secure forward fuel arrangements or bolster supply- or demand-side infrastructure." The report identifies potentially appropriate investments as including "enhancements to natural gas infrastructure or the supply chains for liquefied natural gas and oil; relaxation of rules to allow easier permitting and operation of dual-fuel resources; investments in even more renewable energy and any transmission needed to deliver it; or further measures to significantly reduce demand on the power system or the gas system," or some combination of these.
While reliability is core to the grid operator's priorities, the report acknowledges that New England's policymakers, businesses and citizens also value economic and environmental goals. The report specifically highlighted what it called "the reliability, economic, and environmental consequences of our situation: that regional action to resolve fuel-security risks will involve costly infrastructure investments and perhaps the retention of certain critical energy resources, but inaction will also come with a bill for high energy prices when energy supply is constrained—as well as the potential for greater risks to power system reliability and higher emissions."
The report cites competitive forces has having "unleashed new approaches for producing electricity in a cleaner way and integrating technology that enables different types of resources to participate in the wholesale markets." It notes new resource types entering the wholesale market, including demand resources, and fast-responding energy storage devices.
With respect to energy supply, the 2018 outlook notes that the amount of wind and solar power in New England continues to grow "and is making a difference in how the ISO operates the power system and designs the wholesale markets." In 2017, the amount of new wind power seeking interconnection in New England surpassed proposed new natural-gas-fired generation for the first time, including significant amounts in Maine and offshore of Massachusetts.
On the demand side, it notes that significant investments in solar resources and energy-efficiency measures have moderated demand for wholesale electricity, but that electrifying the transportation and heating sectors to reduce their carbon emissions could lead to increased demand.
ISO-NE has previously identified the risk that power plants will run out of fuel as the foremost challenge to a reliable power grid in New England. Last month, ISO-NE released an operational fuel security study analyzing fuel security risks facing region's power plants under a wide range of hypothetical future scenarios. That report concluded that maintaining the electric grid's reliability "is likely to become more challenging, especially if current power system trends continue."
The 2018 Regional Electricity Outlook notes that while ISO-NE plays a role in addressing regional fuel-delivery constraints, "it will be up to market participants and state officials to take actions to secure forward fuel arrangements or bolster supply- or demand-side infrastructure." The report identifies potentially appropriate investments as including "enhancements to natural gas infrastructure or the supply chains for liquefied natural gas and oil; relaxation of rules to allow easier permitting and operation of dual-fuel resources; investments in even more renewable energy and any transmission needed to deliver it; or further measures to significantly reduce demand on the power system or the gas system," or some combination of these.
While reliability is core to the grid operator's priorities, the report acknowledges that New England's policymakers, businesses and citizens also value economic and environmental goals. The report specifically highlighted what it called "the reliability, economic, and environmental consequences of our situation: that regional action to resolve fuel-security risks will involve costly infrastructure investments and perhaps the retention of certain critical energy resources, but inaction will also come with a bill for high energy prices when energy supply is constrained—as well as the potential for greater risks to power system reliability and higher emissions."
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GAO report on electric grid geomagnetic disturbances
Friday, February 9, 2018
A report released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that U.S. and Canadian electricity suppliers have taken steps to prepare for potential electromagnetic disruptions to the electric grid such as from solar storms or high-altitude nuclear detonations -- but that more research is needed on both geomagnetic disturbances and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses.
Under some circumstances, a severe solar storm or high-altitude nuclear blast could damage the U.S. electric grid and potentially cause extensive outages. Federal energy regulators have used both regulatory and more informal collaborative approaches to address the threat to the electric grid posed by electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances. Regulatory approaches to electromagnetic disturbance readiness include mandatory reliability standards adopted by electric reliability organization NERC, which require some electricity suppliers to assess their vulnerability to extreme solar storms, and developing procedures for responding to grid security emergencies.
In this context, the Government Accountability Office was asked to review electricity industry actions to prepare for and mitigate electromagnetic risks. Its 95-page report, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Electricity Suppliers Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, and Additional Research is Ongoing, examines topics including the degree to which U.S. and Canadian electricity generation and transmission owners and operators have identified information about the effects on the grid caused by geomagnetic disturbances and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP), steps some suppliers have taken to protect against GMD and HEMP, and opportunities for U.S. suppliers to recover costs for protecting against GMD and HEMP.
According to the report, there is "general agreement that more research is needed on both GMD and HEMP." Risks identified include potential voltage instability leading to collapse of the bulk power system and blackouts, as well as possible damage to key system components. But more information is needed, according to the report -- especially on HEMP effects, given that previous studies have focused on impacts to military equipment as opposed to the commercial electric grid.
The cost of addressing reliability concerns can be significant. The GAO report describes some suppliers' reports "that costs they have incurred to protect against GMD and HEMP have been relatively small so far and they expect to recover those costs through customer rates." But the report warns that suppliers could face future increased costs, as a second regulatory standard phases in through 2022. For example, the report cites one supplier serving about 4.5 million retail customers as estimating "the cost of hardening a planned control center against HEMP to be at least $10 million." GAO calculated that fully passing this cost on to customers in a single year would add $2 to the average customer ’s electric bill for that year.
While regulated U.S. suppliers may be able to recover GMD protection costs through rates, the report notes that recovery is less certain for protection against HEMP because less is known about HEMP risks. The report also presages challenges for any kind of reliability-driven cost recovery for independent owners of power plants, who must recover reliability improvement costs through their sales of electricity without assurances about market prices.
Under some circumstances, a severe solar storm or high-altitude nuclear blast could damage the U.S. electric grid and potentially cause extensive outages. Federal energy regulators have used both regulatory and more informal collaborative approaches to address the threat to the electric grid posed by electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances. Regulatory approaches to electromagnetic disturbance readiness include mandatory reliability standards adopted by electric reliability organization NERC, which require some electricity suppliers to assess their vulnerability to extreme solar storms, and developing procedures for responding to grid security emergencies.
In this context, the Government Accountability Office was asked to review electricity industry actions to prepare for and mitigate electromagnetic risks. Its 95-page report, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Electricity Suppliers Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, and Additional Research is Ongoing, examines topics including the degree to which U.S. and Canadian electricity generation and transmission owners and operators have identified information about the effects on the grid caused by geomagnetic disturbances and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP), steps some suppliers have taken to protect against GMD and HEMP, and opportunities for U.S. suppliers to recover costs for protecting against GMD and HEMP.
According to the report, there is "general agreement that more research is needed on both GMD and HEMP." Risks identified include potential voltage instability leading to collapse of the bulk power system and blackouts, as well as possible damage to key system components. But more information is needed, according to the report -- especially on HEMP effects, given that previous studies have focused on impacts to military equipment as opposed to the commercial electric grid.
The cost of addressing reliability concerns can be significant. The GAO report describes some suppliers' reports "that costs they have incurred to protect against GMD and HEMP have been relatively small so far and they expect to recover those costs through customer rates." But the report warns that suppliers could face future increased costs, as a second regulatory standard phases in through 2022. For example, the report cites one supplier serving about 4.5 million retail customers as estimating "the cost of hardening a planned control center against HEMP to be at least $10 million." GAO calculated that fully passing this cost on to customers in a single year would add $2 to the average customer ’s electric bill for that year.
While regulated U.S. suppliers may be able to recover GMD protection costs through rates, the report notes that recovery is less certain for protection against HEMP because less is known about HEMP risks. The report also presages challenges for any kind of reliability-driven cost recovery for independent owners of power plants, who must recover reliability improvement costs through their sales of electricity without assurances about market prices.
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FERC to hold session on state policies, wholesale markets
Wednesday, March 8, 2017
U.S. energy regulators have scheduled a two-day technical conference to consider how state energy policies affect wholesale electricity markets.
In a March 3 notice of technical conference, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission gave public notice that it will hold a technical conference on May 1 and 2, 2017. The notice describes tensions between competitive wholesale energy and capacity markets and state policies. On the one hand, the Commission noted, "Competitive wholesale energy and capacity markets bring value to customers by efficiently pricing energy and capacity , taking into account the operational needs and the dynamics of the transmission system , and providing transparent signals for investment and retirement of resources." Generally speaking, these wholesale competitive markets currently select resources based on principles of operational and economic efficiency without specific regard to resource type
But on the other hand, the Commission notes recent increases in "interest by state policy makers to pursue policies that prioritize certain resources or resource attributes" (such as renewable resources, or in-state resources). That has led to what the Commission calls an "open question": "how the competitive wholesale markets, particularly in states or regions that restructured their retail electricity service, can select resources of interest to state policy makers while preserving the benefits of regional markets and economic resource selection." These topics have come up in discussions relating to several eastern regional transmission organizations and independent system operators, such as the IMAPP process in New England, and similar efforts in PJM and NYISO to consider the integration of public policy into markets.
To foster further FERC-level discussion about the development of regional solutions that "reconcile the competitive market framework with the increasing interest by states to support particular resources or resource attributes," the Commission has scheduled the May 1-2 technical conference. The notice specifically references a range in potential long-term expectations regarding the relative roles of wholesale markets and state policies in shaping the resource mix -- ranging from no state role on the one end, to state authority over resource selection that must be accounted for in wholesale market design -- and a variety of potential solutions in between.
Anyone who wishes to participate in the conference may submit a nomination form to FERC online by 5:00 p.m. on March 17, 2017.
In a March 3 notice of technical conference, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission gave public notice that it will hold a technical conference on May 1 and 2, 2017. The notice describes tensions between competitive wholesale energy and capacity markets and state policies. On the one hand, the Commission noted, "Competitive wholesale energy and capacity markets bring value to customers by efficiently pricing energy and capacity , taking into account the operational needs and the dynamics of the transmission system , and providing transparent signals for investment and retirement of resources." Generally speaking, these wholesale competitive markets currently select resources based on principles of operational and economic efficiency without specific regard to resource type
But on the other hand, the Commission notes recent increases in "interest by state policy makers to pursue policies that prioritize certain resources or resource attributes" (such as renewable resources, or in-state resources). That has led to what the Commission calls an "open question": "how the competitive wholesale markets, particularly in states or regions that restructured their retail electricity service, can select resources of interest to state policy makers while preserving the benefits of regional markets and economic resource selection." These topics have come up in discussions relating to several eastern regional transmission organizations and independent system operators, such as the IMAPP process in New England, and similar efforts in PJM and NYISO to consider the integration of public policy into markets.
To foster further FERC-level discussion about the development of regional solutions that "reconcile the competitive market framework with the increasing interest by states to support particular resources or resource attributes," the Commission has scheduled the May 1-2 technical conference. The notice specifically references a range in potential long-term expectations regarding the relative roles of wholesale markets and state policies in shaping the resource mix -- ranging from no state role on the one end, to state authority over resource selection that must be accounted for in wholesale market design -- and a variety of potential solutions in between.
Anyone who wishes to participate in the conference may submit a nomination form to FERC online by 5:00 p.m. on March 17, 2017.
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FERC electric storage policy statement
Monday, January 23, 2017
U.S. energy regulators have issued a policy statement addressing how electric storage resources may provide services at a mix of cost-based and market-based rates. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's January 19, 2017 policy statement on storage provides insight into how the Commission views its role in regulating the rates at which energy storage would be compensated -- but was accompanied by a dissenting view expressed by Commissioner LaFleur. The result is a mix of both greater certainty and continued debate.
Electricity storage is a growing industry, both in terms of installed capacity and its capability to flexibly support the grid. Today's electric storage resources can both charge and discharge electricity to and from the grid. Moreover they can provide various services to multiple entities -- for example, consumers, grid operators, or transmission and distribution utilities -- and can switch nearly instantaneously between modes of operation or services provided. In these ways, electric storage resources share some functions of consumer load, generation, transmission, and distribution.
Some of these functions -- e.g. sales of electric energy at wholesale in an organized market -- may be compensated at market-based rates. But other functions of energy storage could be compensated at cost-based rates under federal law -- perhaps functioning as a transmission asset, compensated through transmission rates. Thus it's possible that a particular energy storage resource -- think a battery attached to the electric grid, perhaps sited at a factory or other consumer's location -- might be compensated for its operations under both cost-based and market-based rates.
This is a good thing, according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. According to the January 19, 2017 policy statement, "Enabling electric storage resources to provide multiple services (including both cost-based and market-based services) ensures that the full capabilities of these resources can be realized, thereby maximizing their efficiency and value for the system and to consumers."
But previous proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have exposed some concerns about allowing electric storage resources to recover costs through both cost-based and market-based rates concurrently. As described by the Commission, these include "double recovery of costs to the detriment of cost-based ratepayers, potential for adverse competitive impacts in wholesale electric markets to the detriment of other competitors, and the need for independence of regional grid operators from market participants."
With respect to utilities subject to its jurisdiction, the Commission's recent policy statement, "Utilitzation of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery," provides guidance regarding these issues. It details possible approaches for avoiding double recovery of costs. The Commission notes that with regard to adverse market impacts, it "is not convinced there will be a detriment to other market competitors." The policy statement also offers guidance on how grid operators and electric storage owners or operators should interact, to ensure independence as required by Commission policy.
Commissioner LaFleur issued a dissenting opinion, while nevertheless calling storage "an important and promising resource that warrants Commission attention to ensure that our markets are appropriately adapted to recognize storage’s unique characteristics and contributions." While expressing an openness "to potential structures that compensate storage providing transmission service at a cost-based rate while participating in the wholesale markets", she expressed concern "about the broad rationale for this approach put forth in the Policy Statement," which she called "both flawed in its conclusions and premature in its timing." In particular her dissent focused on what she described as "the Policy Statement’s sweeping conclusions about the potential impacts of multiple payment streams on pricing in wholesale electric markets" -- and whether it might have implications for resources other than storage that receive multiple payment streams. She also disagreed with the Commission's decision to issue the policy statement separate from its pending Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the participation of electric storage in wholesale markets.
Both the majority policy statement and Commissioner LaFleur's dissent shed light on how the Commission approaches energy storage rate issues. Storage seems universally considered worth investigating or supporting, but disagreement remains within the Commission with respect to some aspects of how storage resources should be compensated (as well as procedural issues related to the Commission's consideration of these questions). Nevertheless the policy statement does provide guidance and clarification into how a majority of the Commission views the compensation of storage resources under both cost- and market-based rate structures -- while also framing future discussions over how storage resources will be integrated into markets.
Electricity storage is a growing industry, both in terms of installed capacity and its capability to flexibly support the grid. Today's electric storage resources can both charge and discharge electricity to and from the grid. Moreover they can provide various services to multiple entities -- for example, consumers, grid operators, or transmission and distribution utilities -- and can switch nearly instantaneously between modes of operation or services provided. In these ways, electric storage resources share some functions of consumer load, generation, transmission, and distribution.
Some of these functions -- e.g. sales of electric energy at wholesale in an organized market -- may be compensated at market-based rates. But other functions of energy storage could be compensated at cost-based rates under federal law -- perhaps functioning as a transmission asset, compensated through transmission rates. Thus it's possible that a particular energy storage resource -- think a battery attached to the electric grid, perhaps sited at a factory or other consumer's location -- might be compensated for its operations under both cost-based and market-based rates.
This is a good thing, according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. According to the January 19, 2017 policy statement, "Enabling electric storage resources to provide multiple services (including both cost-based and market-based services) ensures that the full capabilities of these resources can be realized, thereby maximizing their efficiency and value for the system and to consumers."
But previous proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have exposed some concerns about allowing electric storage resources to recover costs through both cost-based and market-based rates concurrently. As described by the Commission, these include "double recovery of costs to the detriment of cost-based ratepayers, potential for adverse competitive impacts in wholesale electric markets to the detriment of other competitors, and the need for independence of regional grid operators from market participants."
With respect to utilities subject to its jurisdiction, the Commission's recent policy statement, "Utilitzation of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery," provides guidance regarding these issues. It details possible approaches for avoiding double recovery of costs. The Commission notes that with regard to adverse market impacts, it "is not convinced there will be a detriment to other market competitors." The policy statement also offers guidance on how grid operators and electric storage owners or operators should interact, to ensure independence as required by Commission policy.
Commissioner LaFleur issued a dissenting opinion, while nevertheless calling storage "an important and promising resource that warrants Commission attention to ensure that our markets are appropriately adapted to recognize storage’s unique characteristics and contributions." While expressing an openness "to potential structures that compensate storage providing transmission service at a cost-based rate while participating in the wholesale markets", she expressed concern "about the broad rationale for this approach put forth in the Policy Statement," which she called "both flawed in its conclusions and premature in its timing." In particular her dissent focused on what she described as "the Policy Statement’s sweeping conclusions about the potential impacts of multiple payment streams on pricing in wholesale electric markets" -- and whether it might have implications for resources other than storage that receive multiple payment streams. She also disagreed with the Commission's decision to issue the policy statement separate from its pending Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the participation of electric storage in wholesale markets.
Both the majority policy statement and Commissioner LaFleur's dissent shed light on how the Commission approaches energy storage rate issues. Storage seems universally considered worth investigating or supporting, but disagreement remains within the Commission with respect to some aspects of how storage resources should be compensated (as well as procedural issues related to the Commission's consideration of these questions). Nevertheless the policy statement does provide guidance and clarification into how a majority of the Commission views the compensation of storage resources under both cost- and market-based rate structures -- while also framing future discussions over how storage resources will be integrated into markets.
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Court ruling cuts demand response uncertainty
Tuesday, January 26, 2016
Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding federal regulation of the compensation paid for wholesale electricity demand response. The Court's opinion, FERC v. Electric Power Supply Assn., hinges on the distinction between wholesale and retail sales of electricity. It provides the latest look at the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction over the electric grid.
Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is authorized to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." Its jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act does not extend to "any other sale of electric energy," such as a retail sale. Traditionally, sales of energy directly to users are viewed as retail sales subject to state ratemaking jurisdiction, while sales of energy for resale are viewed as wholesale sales subject to federal ratemaking jurisdiction.
The case before the Supreme Court arose from a challenge by a group of generators to FERC Order No. 745. Through that order, FERC adopted a rule requiring wholesale market operators to compensate cost-effective demand response resources for their performance at the same price paid to generators. Last year, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated FERC Order No. 745 on the ground that FERC lacked jurisdiction to set rates for this kind of demand response. The D.C. Circuit implied that "wholesale" demand response was really retail in nature and thus subject only to state ratemaking jurisdiction. FERC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
As described in the Supreme Court opinion, the appeal presented two legal issues:
The case now returns to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. The most widespread direct impact of the Supreme Court in FERC v. EPSA will likely be a reduction to the uncertainty that has hung over the markets since the D.C. Circuit decision. Market participants, consumers, aggregators, and grid operators have all been awaiting the ruling. Some market changes, such as ISO New England's implementation of full integration of demand response, had been delayed pending a decision from the Court, as regional wholesale demand response programs hinge on FERC approvals under the Federal Power Act. With the jurisdictional question resolved, these changes, and other refinements to regional transmission organizations' wholesale demand response programs, can now get back on track.
Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is authorized to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." Its jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act does not extend to "any other sale of electric energy," such as a retail sale. Traditionally, sales of energy directly to users are viewed as retail sales subject to state ratemaking jurisdiction, while sales of energy for resale are viewed as wholesale sales subject to federal ratemaking jurisdiction.
The case before the Supreme Court arose from a challenge by a group of generators to FERC Order No. 745. Through that order, FERC adopted a rule requiring wholesale market operators to compensate cost-effective demand response resources for their performance at the same price paid to generators. Last year, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated FERC Order No. 745 on the ground that FERC lacked jurisdiction to set rates for this kind of demand response. The D.C. Circuit implied that "wholesale" demand response was really retail in nature and thus subject only to state ratemaking jurisdiction. FERC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
As described in the Supreme Court opinion, the appeal presented two legal issues:
First, and fundamentally, does the FPA permit FERC to regulate these demand response transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge on the States’ authority? Second, even if FERC has the requisite statutory power, did the Commission fail to justify adequately why demand response providers and electricity producers should receive the same compensation? The court below ruled against FERC on both scores. We disagree.In analyzing the first issue, the majority found that compensation for demand response directly affects wholesale prices -- "Indeed, it is hard to think of a practice that does so more." The majority found, "A FERC regulation does not run afoul of section 824(b)’s prescription just because it affects―even substantially―the quantity or terms of retail sales." The Court finally noted that FERC had offered substantial reasoning and arguments in support of its conclusion that demand response should be paid comparably to generation, and thus that FERC's actions satisfied the applicable standard that they not be "arbitrary and capricious."
The case now returns to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. The most widespread direct impact of the Supreme Court in FERC v. EPSA will likely be a reduction to the uncertainty that has hung over the markets since the D.C. Circuit decision. Market participants, consumers, aggregators, and grid operators have all been awaiting the ruling. Some market changes, such as ISO New England's implementation of full integration of demand response, had been delayed pending a decision from the Court, as regional wholesale demand response programs hinge on FERC approvals under the Federal Power Act. With the jurisdictional question resolved, these changes, and other refinements to regional transmission organizations' wholesale demand response programs, can now get back on track.
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US Supreme Court upholds wholesale demand response
Monday, January 25, 2016
The Supreme Court of the United States has issued an opinion upholding regional electricity grid operators' ability to operate wholesale demand response programs under federal authority. In that opinion, FERC v. Electric Power Supply Assn., the Supreme Court reversed a lower court's decision invalidating the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulation of electricity demand response.
While further evolution of demand response will continue, the Supreme Court's 6-to-2 ruling puts regional wholesale demand response programs back on surer footing after the uncertainty injected by the lower court's previous ruling. A grid portfolio including some degree of demand response can provide beneficial environmental, reliability, and economic effects compared to pure generation. It appears relatively more likely that existing regional wholesale demand response programs may continue to operate under federal authority, and relatively less likely that a new state-driven demand response paradigm will arise.
As described in the Supreme Court opinion, wholesale electricity demand response programs pay consumers for commitments to reduce their consumption of electricity during peak demand periods or other times of scarcity or high prices. For about 15 years, wholesale market operators have increasingly adopted wholesale demand response programs, with the blessing of both Congress and the FERC. In 2011, the FERC issued its Order No. 745, establishing a rule requiring market operators to pay the same price to cost-effective demand response providers for conserving energy as to generators for producing it.
But that order was challenged by an association of generators, among others. In May 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission vacating Order No. 745. Its chief logic was that FERC lacked authority to issue the order on jurisdictional grounds -- because in the lower court's view, Order No. 745 directly regulates the retail electric market. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC is authorized to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce," but cannot regulate "any other sale" (i.e. any retail sale) of electricity.
But today's Supreme Court ruling held that the Federal Power Act does provide FERC with the authority to regulate wholesale market operators' compensation of demand response bids. The Court divided its analysis of this point in three parts.
First, the Supreme Court held that the practices at issue directly affect wholesale rates. In the Court's words, "Wholesale demand response is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate."
Second, the Supreme Court noted that FERC has not regulated retail sales. "Here, every aspect of FERC's regulatory plan happens exclusively on the wholesale market and governs exclusively that market's rules. The Commission's justifications for regulating demand response are likewise only about improving the wholesale market." Putting the first and second sets of conclusions together, the Court found that the rule established by Order No. 745 complies with the plain terms of the Federal Power Act.
Third, the Court noted that adopting a contrary view would conflict with the core purposes of the Federal Power Act: "The FPA should not be read, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently enables FERC to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the wholesale energy market."
The Supreme Court also addressed an alternative holding by the D.C. Circuit Court that the Order No. 745 compensation scheme is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court noted that its "important but limited role" in reviewing FERC's decision "is to ensure that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking." Noting FERC's detailed explanation of its choice to compensate demand response providers at LMP, the same price paid to generators, and its lengthy responses to contrary views, the Supreme Court held that "FERC's serious and careful discussion of the issue satisfies the arbitrary and capricious standard."
Justice Kagan delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, noting his belief that the Federal Power Act prohibits the FERC from regulating the demand response of "retail purchasers of power." Justice Alito did not participate in the case.
The case now returns to the D.C. Circuit for "further proceedings consistent with this opinion." If Order No. 745 stands and FERC retains jurisdiction over the compensation paid to wholesale demand response market participants, it seems likely that existing regional wholesale demand response programs will continue to operate under federal authority. As the Supreme Court found, these wholesale demand response programs can provide significant consumer savings when properly implemented. How will demand response continue to evolve in the wake of FERC v. EPSA? How does this decision reshape the boundary between wholesale (federal) and retail (state) jurisdictions? What's next for demand response?
As described in the Supreme Court opinion, wholesale electricity demand response programs pay consumers for commitments to reduce their consumption of electricity during peak demand periods or other times of scarcity or high prices. For about 15 years, wholesale market operators have increasingly adopted wholesale demand response programs, with the blessing of both Congress and the FERC. In 2011, the FERC issued its Order No. 745, establishing a rule requiring market operators to pay the same price to cost-effective demand response providers for conserving energy as to generators for producing it.
But that order was challenged by an association of generators, among others. In May 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission vacating Order No. 745. Its chief logic was that FERC lacked authority to issue the order on jurisdictional grounds -- because in the lower court's view, Order No. 745 directly regulates the retail electric market. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC is authorized to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce," but cannot regulate "any other sale" (i.e. any retail sale) of electricity.
But today's Supreme Court ruling held that the Federal Power Act does provide FERC with the authority to regulate wholesale market operators' compensation of demand response bids. The Court divided its analysis of this point in three parts.
First, the Supreme Court held that the practices at issue directly affect wholesale rates. In the Court's words, "Wholesale demand response is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate."
Second, the Supreme Court noted that FERC has not regulated retail sales. "Here, every aspect of FERC's regulatory plan happens exclusively on the wholesale market and governs exclusively that market's rules. The Commission's justifications for regulating demand response are likewise only about improving the wholesale market." Putting the first and second sets of conclusions together, the Court found that the rule established by Order No. 745 complies with the plain terms of the Federal Power Act.
Third, the Court noted that adopting a contrary view would conflict with the core purposes of the Federal Power Act: "The FPA should not be read, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently enables FERC to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the wholesale energy market."
The Supreme Court also addressed an alternative holding by the D.C. Circuit Court that the Order No. 745 compensation scheme is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court noted that its "important but limited role" in reviewing FERC's decision "is to ensure that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking." Noting FERC's detailed explanation of its choice to compensate demand response providers at LMP, the same price paid to generators, and its lengthy responses to contrary views, the Supreme Court held that "FERC's serious and careful discussion of the issue satisfies the arbitrary and capricious standard."
Justice Kagan delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, noting his belief that the Federal Power Act prohibits the FERC from regulating the demand response of "retail purchasers of power." Justice Alito did not participate in the case.
The case now returns to the D.C. Circuit for "further proceedings consistent with this opinion." If Order No. 745 stands and FERC retains jurisdiction over the compensation paid to wholesale demand response market participants, it seems likely that existing regional wholesale demand response programs will continue to operate under federal authority. As the Supreme Court found, these wholesale demand response programs can provide significant consumer savings when properly implemented. How will demand response continue to evolve in the wake of FERC v. EPSA? How does this decision reshape the boundary between wholesale (federal) and retail (state) jurisdictions? What's next for demand response?
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Record low prices in summer 2015 New England wholesale electricity market
Tuesday, November 3, 2015
The summer of 2015 brought New England the lowest wholesale
electricity prices since 2003, thanks to record low prices for natural
gas. According to regional grid operator ISO New England Inc., this
illustrates what happens "when New England power plants can access the
vast supply
of lower-priced, domestic natural gas being produced in the Marcellus
shale deposit."
In a post on its ISO Newswire site, the grid operator noted that the average real-time wholesale electricity price for June, July, and August 2015 was $26.86 per megawatt-hour (MWh). By comparison, the average real-time price of wholesale electric energy in 2014 was $63.32 per megawatt-hour. While summer energy prices have typically averaged lower than winter prices in New England, 2015's summer prices were low even in comparison to other recent summers: $34.31 in 2014, or $43.94 in 2013.
What explains New England's low wholesale electricity prices this summer? According to ISO New England, it's because existing natural gas-fired power plants could get fuel at a low price:
New England's average summer electricity price was even below that of other regions, like the Midwest. According to ISO-NE, "This summer’s prices indicate that the region’s electricity prices can be competitive, in the more commonly understood sense, with other regions of the US when low-cost fuel is available." Indeed, at times the price of natural gas in New England was below that of the benchmark Henry Hub.
The post also describes how heavy winter demand for natural gas for both heating and power generation, combined with pipeline constraints, yields high natural gas prices and thus high electricity prices. This has occurred repeatedly in recent winters, such as in January and February 2014 and February 2015. What is at issue is thus the ability of the interstate natural gas pipeline transportation network to ship enough gas into the Northeast -- a capability exceeded through much of the recent winters, with the resulting price paid in coal and oil emissions as well as dollars.
As ISO-NE notes, most customers' retail rates for electricity are set using mechanisms to reduce rate volatility, and time of use rates are not yet widely adopted. But the net movement of wholesale markets is eventually priced into retail rates. Can New England keep competitive with other regions?
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| ISO-NE, "Summer 2015: The lowest natural gas and power prices since 2003" |
In a post on its ISO Newswire site, the grid operator noted that the average real-time wholesale electricity price for June, July, and August 2015 was $26.86 per megawatt-hour (MWh). By comparison, the average real-time price of wholesale electric energy in 2014 was $63.32 per megawatt-hour. While summer energy prices have typically averaged lower than winter prices in New England, 2015's summer prices were low even in comparison to other recent summers: $34.31 in 2014, or $43.94 in 2013.
What explains New England's low wholesale electricity prices this summer? According to ISO New England, it's because existing natural gas-fired power plants could get fuel at a low price:
In essence, the reason was the low price of natural gas that could be delivered to the power plants that burn natural gas to make electricity. For most of the year, the price of natural gas is low in New England, and as a consequence, the demand for natural gas for both heating and power generation just continues to grow. In fact, in 2014, New England power generators using natural gas produced 44% of the region’s electricity.The ISO-NE post describes how low-priced natural gas plus adequate interstate pipeline transportation capacity yields New England low electricity prices. Indeed, the average price of natural gas in New England during June, July, and August averaged a record low $2/MMBtu. This is nearly 40% below last year's summer average ($3.27/MMBtu), itself the next-lowest summer record.
New England's average summer electricity price was even below that of other regions, like the Midwest. According to ISO-NE, "This summer’s prices indicate that the region’s electricity prices can be competitive, in the more commonly understood sense, with other regions of the US when low-cost fuel is available." Indeed, at times the price of natural gas in New England was below that of the benchmark Henry Hub.
The post also describes how heavy winter demand for natural gas for both heating and power generation, combined with pipeline constraints, yields high natural gas prices and thus high electricity prices. This has occurred repeatedly in recent winters, such as in January and February 2014 and February 2015. What is at issue is thus the ability of the interstate natural gas pipeline transportation network to ship enough gas into the Northeast -- a capability exceeded through much of the recent winters, with the resulting price paid in coal and oil emissions as well as dollars.
As ISO-NE notes, most customers' retail rates for electricity are set using mechanisms to reduce rate volatility, and time of use rates are not yet widely adopted. But the net movement of wholesale markets is eventually priced into retail rates. Can New England keep competitive with other regions?
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Block Island offshore wind celebrated, challenged
Thursday, August 20, 2015
U.S. and Rhode Island officials recently celebrated the start of construction on the Block Island Wind Farm, which is on track to be the first commercial offshore wind farm in the U.S. The five-turbine, 30-megawatt project under development by Deepwater Wind is scheduled to come online in 2016; turbine foundation construction and other "steel in the water" activities are underway. As a pioneer in U.S. offshore wind development, the Block Island project has survived years of permitting uncertainty and repeated legal challenges by project opponents. But another such lawsuit was filed this week in federal court. What does the future hold for the Block Island Wind Farm?
Project developer Deepwater Wind is owned principally by an entity of the D.E. Shaw group. Its Block Island project is currently under construction in Rhode Island state waters about three nautical miles southeast of Block Island. The project will feed power directly to consumers on Block Island, but also includes a 25-mile bi-directional submerged transmission cable between Block Island and the mainland. The project's finances rest in part on a power purchase agreement through which Deepwater Wind will sell power to utility National Grid.
That power purchase agreement, or PPA, has been the subject of several legal challenges. Those challenges often cite the deal's cost: pricing for the Block Island power starts as high as 24.4 cents per kilowatt-hour, and escalates 3.5 percent annually. These prices are more than double the typical Rhode Island energy price, for an estimated $497 million in above-market costs over the 20-year deal.
In 2009 and early 2010, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission rejected proposals by Deepwater Wind and National Grid, largely over cost. The parties then returned with a revised proposal. In 2010, TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. unsuccessfully argued that the Rhode Island commission shouldn't consider that proposal due to constitutional infirmities in the Rhode Island law favoring renewable power contracts with in-state projects. On August 16, 2010, the Commission issued its order approving the PPA. After that order was appealed to the state Supreme Court, the Supreme Court issued a written opinion upholding the Commission's Order on July 1, 2011. In 2012 and in 2015, project opponents petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to invalidate the Rhode Island commission's action, which FERC declined to do. Through all this, the project moved forward and ultimately began local construction earlier this year.
But the project is not yet completely out of stormy seas. On August 14, 2015, plaintiffs with a history of engagement in some of these earlier challenges filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Rhode Island. As in previous challenges, this complaint argues that the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission violated federal laws in approving the Block Island deal because only the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may regulate wholesale electricity sales. While it is possible that this case could be swiftly dismissed, if it lingers it could add uncertainty to the project until its resolution. Last year a federal court invalidated a FERC ruling on the grounds that it impermissibly tread on state rights to set retail electricity rates. That case, Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
With construction underway, the Block Island project now has significant inertia behind it. What impact will the recently filed lawsuit have? Will it affect Deepwater Wind's position as "first in the water" in the race for U.S. commercial offshore wind development?
Project developer Deepwater Wind is owned principally by an entity of the D.E. Shaw group. Its Block Island project is currently under construction in Rhode Island state waters about three nautical miles southeast of Block Island. The project will feed power directly to consumers on Block Island, but also includes a 25-mile bi-directional submerged transmission cable between Block Island and the mainland. The project's finances rest in part on a power purchase agreement through which Deepwater Wind will sell power to utility National Grid.
That power purchase agreement, or PPA, has been the subject of several legal challenges. Those challenges often cite the deal's cost: pricing for the Block Island power starts as high as 24.4 cents per kilowatt-hour, and escalates 3.5 percent annually. These prices are more than double the typical Rhode Island energy price, for an estimated $497 million in above-market costs over the 20-year deal.
In 2009 and early 2010, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission rejected proposals by Deepwater Wind and National Grid, largely over cost. The parties then returned with a revised proposal. In 2010, TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. unsuccessfully argued that the Rhode Island commission shouldn't consider that proposal due to constitutional infirmities in the Rhode Island law favoring renewable power contracts with in-state projects. On August 16, 2010, the Commission issued its order approving the PPA. After that order was appealed to the state Supreme Court, the Supreme Court issued a written opinion upholding the Commission's Order on July 1, 2011. In 2012 and in 2015, project opponents petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to invalidate the Rhode Island commission's action, which FERC declined to do. Through all this, the project moved forward and ultimately began local construction earlier this year.
But the project is not yet completely out of stormy seas. On August 14, 2015, plaintiffs with a history of engagement in some of these earlier challenges filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Rhode Island. As in previous challenges, this complaint argues that the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission violated federal laws in approving the Block Island deal because only the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may regulate wholesale electricity sales. While it is possible that this case could be swiftly dismissed, if it lingers it could add uncertainty to the project until its resolution. Last year a federal court invalidated a FERC ruling on the grounds that it impermissibly tread on state rights to set retail electricity rates. That case, Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
With construction underway, the Block Island project now has significant inertia behind it. What impact will the recently filed lawsuit have? Will it affect Deepwater Wind's position as "first in the water" in the race for U.S. commercial offshore wind development?
Labels:
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FERC OKs sale of Dominion merchant power plants to Energy Capital Partners
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Federal regulators approved yesterday the sale of three fossil fuel-fired power plants from energy company Dominion Resources Inc. to Energy Capital Partners LLC for $650 million. The order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission moves the deal closer to fruition. Is the transaction part of a trend in the U.S. energy industry?
Dominion is a major player in the U.S. energy business, serving customers in 15 states with its holdings in both the electricity and natural gas sectors. Dominion owns a portfolio of about 27,000 megawatts of electric generation and 6,400 miles of electric transmission lines, as well as vertically-integrated electric utilities like Dominion Virginia Power. Dominion also owns a large natural gas storage system as well as about 11,000 miles of natural gas transmission, gathering and storage pipelines.
Buyer Energy Capital Partners is a private equity firm focused on investing in North America's energy infrastructure. The firm has recently acquired other electric generation plants, including the 830-megawatt combined-cycle natural gas-fired Red Oak power plant in Sayreville, New Jersey, and the 847-megawatt Broad River simple cycle, natural gas-fired power plant in South Carolina.
Over the past several decades, Dominion added merchant power plants designed not to serve the load of its affiliated utilities. These plants produced electricity from coal, oil and other fossil fuels, and sold the power into regional wholesale markets such as those managed by ISO New England and mid-Atlantic grid operator PJM. But with tighter environmental regulations, and more competitive electricity markets thanks to low-cost natural gas, many New England coal and oil-fired power plants have a hard time succeding in the current markets. As an apparent result, in 2012 said it would sell or close its merchant coal-fired plants to realign its portfolio and improve return on invested capital and shareholder value, and sold the coal- and oil-fired Salem Harbor Power Station in Massachusetts.
In March 2013, Dominion announced a deal to sell its interests in three power plants to Energy Capital Partners. 1,528-megawatt Brayton Point Power Station, in Somerset, Massachusetts, is the largest remaining coal-fired power plant in New England. It has three coal-fired units and one unit capable of being firing oil or natural gas, as well as the coal-fired 1,158-megawatt Kincaid Power Station in Illinois.. Dominion also offered its stake in 1,424 megawatts of capacity at the Elwood Power Station outside Chicago, which is powered by nine 158-MW natural gas-fired combustion turbines.
The deal price announced was $650 million. At least one analyst has noted that after removing tax benefits, the deal implied an underlying price paid per kilowatt of capacity of just over $100, a price 30 times lower than the the cost of building a new coal-fired plant according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
The Federal Trade Commission approved the deal from an antitrust perspective under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in March 2013, so the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approval today was among the final approvals needed.
Fossil fuel and electricity markets are experiencing changes, from tighter air emissions to the prospect of federal carbon regulation. Assuming the Dominion deal actually happens, does it signal a trend of utility divestiture of merchant fossil fuel-fired power plants? Will other utilities exit the merchant electricity generation business? Will we see increased transactional activity, as utilities sell their fossil fuel-fired plants? For how much longer will the buyers run these plants? In the case of the Salem station Dominion sold last year, buyer Footprint Power LLC is demolishing the old plant and redeveloping the site as a natural gas-fired power plant. Will Energy Capital Partners choose to keep Brayton Point operating in a market where margins are often tight? Or is this just the rationalization of Dominion's asset base, with no similar ripples throughout the sector?
Dominion is a major player in the U.S. energy business, serving customers in 15 states with its holdings in both the electricity and natural gas sectors. Dominion owns a portfolio of about 27,000 megawatts of electric generation and 6,400 miles of electric transmission lines, as well as vertically-integrated electric utilities like Dominion Virginia Power. Dominion also owns a large natural gas storage system as well as about 11,000 miles of natural gas transmission, gathering and storage pipelines.
Buyer Energy Capital Partners is a private equity firm focused on investing in North America's energy infrastructure. The firm has recently acquired other electric generation plants, including the 830-megawatt combined-cycle natural gas-fired Red Oak power plant in Sayreville, New Jersey, and the 847-megawatt Broad River simple cycle, natural gas-fired power plant in South Carolina.
Over the past several decades, Dominion added merchant power plants designed not to serve the load of its affiliated utilities. These plants produced electricity from coal, oil and other fossil fuels, and sold the power into regional wholesale markets such as those managed by ISO New England and mid-Atlantic grid operator PJM. But with tighter environmental regulations, and more competitive electricity markets thanks to low-cost natural gas, many New England coal and oil-fired power plants have a hard time succeding in the current markets. As an apparent result, in 2012 said it would sell or close its merchant coal-fired plants to realign its portfolio and improve return on invested capital and shareholder value, and sold the coal- and oil-fired Salem Harbor Power Station in Massachusetts.
In March 2013, Dominion announced a deal to sell its interests in three power plants to Energy Capital Partners. 1,528-megawatt Brayton Point Power Station, in Somerset, Massachusetts, is the largest remaining coal-fired power plant in New England. It has three coal-fired units and one unit capable of being firing oil or natural gas, as well as the coal-fired 1,158-megawatt Kincaid Power Station in Illinois.. Dominion also offered its stake in 1,424 megawatts of capacity at the Elwood Power Station outside Chicago, which is powered by nine 158-MW natural gas-fired combustion turbines.
The deal price announced was $650 million. At least one analyst has noted that after removing tax benefits, the deal implied an underlying price paid per kilowatt of capacity of just over $100, a price 30 times lower than the the cost of building a new coal-fired plant according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
The Federal Trade Commission approved the deal from an antitrust perspective under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in March 2013, so the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approval today was among the final approvals needed.
Fossil fuel and electricity markets are experiencing changes, from tighter air emissions to the prospect of federal carbon regulation. Assuming the Dominion deal actually happens, does it signal a trend of utility divestiture of merchant fossil fuel-fired power plants? Will other utilities exit the merchant electricity generation business? Will we see increased transactional activity, as utilities sell their fossil fuel-fired plants? For how much longer will the buyers run these plants? In the case of the Salem station Dominion sold last year, buyer Footprint Power LLC is demolishing the old plant and redeveloping the site as a natural gas-fired power plant. Will Energy Capital Partners choose to keep Brayton Point operating in a market where margins are often tight? Or is this just the rationalization of Dominion's asset base, with no similar ripples throughout the sector?
Labels:
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wholesale
Maine standard offer prices jump up 23%
Thursday, July 25, 2013
The upward trend in wholesale natural gas and electricity prices in New England will begin to hit retail consumers later this summer, based on the bids accepted today by the Maine Public Utilities Commission for standard offer electricity service.
Following Maine’s deregulation of the electric power industry, transmission and distribution utilities no longer sell electricity but merely provide wires enabling the delivery of power. For their energy needs, customers may choose among licensed competitive electricity providers, or may receive so-called “standard offer service” by default. Most residential consumers receive standard offer service, while more than half of the load of medium and large commercial and industrial customers is served by customer-selected competitive providers.
The providers of standard offer service, and the prices customers pay for standard offer service, are selected by the Maine Public Utilities Commission through a competitive process. In deliberations this afternoon, the Commission established new prices for standard offer electricity supply service for medium commercial and industrial customers of Maine’s two largest utilities, Central Maine Power Co. and Bangor Hydro Electric Co. Over a six-month term starting on September 1, 2013, Central Maine Power’s medium commercial and industrial customers taking standard offer service will pay an average price of 7.5 cents/kWh. Bangor Hydro customers will pay 7.45 cents/kWh. These new prices are over 23% higher than current standard offer prices for these customers, and are between 17% and 19% higher compared to last year’s standard offer pricing.
Why have these prices gone up? One explanation is that suppliers are pricing the recent upward trend in regional wholesale natural gas and electricity prices into their retail bids. Wholesale electricity pricing in New England is generally set by the price of natural gas. Despite the availability of low-cost natural gas throughout most of the country, peak demands for natural gas in New England for heating and for electric power generation exceed the capability of the natural gas pipeline network to deliver gas into the region. As a result, the wholesale price of natural gas – and electricity – spikes as demand for gas increases. Based on last winter's experience with this phenomenon, retail electricity suppliers are expecting similar high wholesale prices this winter, and are increasing their retail rate bids accordingly.
One solution that could keep downward pressure on the cost of natural gas and electricity is expanded pipeline infrastructure to enable a balance between supply and demand for natural gas deliveries into New England. New England states are working to promote this solution, which could save consumers over $1 billion per year. Until then, the likelihood is for continued upward pressure on wholesale electricity prices, and corresponding upward jumps in the retail price consumers pay for electricity as evidenced by the new standard offer prices.
Following Maine’s deregulation of the electric power industry, transmission and distribution utilities no longer sell electricity but merely provide wires enabling the delivery of power. For their energy needs, customers may choose among licensed competitive electricity providers, or may receive so-called “standard offer service” by default. Most residential consumers receive standard offer service, while more than half of the load of medium and large commercial and industrial customers is served by customer-selected competitive providers.
The providers of standard offer service, and the prices customers pay for standard offer service, are selected by the Maine Public Utilities Commission through a competitive process. In deliberations this afternoon, the Commission established new prices for standard offer electricity supply service for medium commercial and industrial customers of Maine’s two largest utilities, Central Maine Power Co. and Bangor Hydro Electric Co. Over a six-month term starting on September 1, 2013, Central Maine Power’s medium commercial and industrial customers taking standard offer service will pay an average price of 7.5 cents/kWh. Bangor Hydro customers will pay 7.45 cents/kWh. These new prices are over 23% higher than current standard offer prices for these customers, and are between 17% and 19% higher compared to last year’s standard offer pricing.
Why have these prices gone up? One explanation is that suppliers are pricing the recent upward trend in regional wholesale natural gas and electricity prices into their retail bids. Wholesale electricity pricing in New England is generally set by the price of natural gas. Despite the availability of low-cost natural gas throughout most of the country, peak demands for natural gas in New England for heating and for electric power generation exceed the capability of the natural gas pipeline network to deliver gas into the region. As a result, the wholesale price of natural gas – and electricity – spikes as demand for gas increases. Based on last winter's experience with this phenomenon, retail electricity suppliers are expecting similar high wholesale prices this winter, and are increasing their retail rate bids accordingly.
One solution that could keep downward pressure on the cost of natural gas and electricity is expanded pipeline infrastructure to enable a balance between supply and demand for natural gas deliveries into New England. New England states are working to promote this solution, which could save consumers over $1 billion per year. Until then, the likelihood is for continued upward pressure on wholesale electricity prices, and corresponding upward jumps in the retail price consumers pay for electricity as evidenced by the new standard offer prices.
Labels:
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Maine utility launches time-of-use rates
Wednesday, December 12, 2012
A Maine electric utility has launched a program to offer residential consumers rates that vary depending on whether the consumption occurs during times of peak demand on the electric grid. Central Maine Power Company's residential time-of-use rates are designed to encourage consumers to shift their use of electricity-intensive equipment to off-peak hours, generally between 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. and on weekends. How many customers will choose this option? What effects will it have, both for the consumers opting in and for society as a whole?
Traditionally, electric ratepayers pay the same price for every kilowatt-hour of energy they consume, without regard to the time of consumption or to conditions on the grid. But the cost of producing a given kilowatt-hour of electricity depends on factors including the portfolio of generators operating at the time, as well as on the instantaneous demand for electricity in the overall regional market. Because they are not directly exposed to the real-time price of power, consumers individually and collectively may not make efficiency choices about how much power they consume, and when they consume it. For example, energy prices are typically lower at night, when demand is reduced, but consumers have not traditionally had any incentive to shift their consumption to lower-priced nighttime hours. Some utilities have offered industrial and commercial businesses time-of-use rates to encourage efficiency, but most residential ratepayers have not had this option in recent years.
Central Maine Power now offers residential consumers the option to choose time-of-use rates. Prices during peak hours will be about 15 percent higher than under the default rate schedule, with off-peak prices about 20 percent below the default rates. The structure offers the opportunity for consumers to choose to shift heavy-consuming applications like air conditioning and heating to off-peak hours. This could save these consumers money - but it would require them to modify their behavior, invest in new "smart" technology, or both. Will consumers find the opportunity for savings to be worth these changes?
The current enrollment window is open through January 31, 2013.
Traditionally, electric ratepayers pay the same price for every kilowatt-hour of energy they consume, without regard to the time of consumption or to conditions on the grid. But the cost of producing a given kilowatt-hour of electricity depends on factors including the portfolio of generators operating at the time, as well as on the instantaneous demand for electricity in the overall regional market. Because they are not directly exposed to the real-time price of power, consumers individually and collectively may not make efficiency choices about how much power they consume, and when they consume it. For example, energy prices are typically lower at night, when demand is reduced, but consumers have not traditionally had any incentive to shift their consumption to lower-priced nighttime hours. Some utilities have offered industrial and commercial businesses time-of-use rates to encourage efficiency, but most residential ratepayers have not had this option in recent years.
Central Maine Power now offers residential consumers the option to choose time-of-use rates. Prices during peak hours will be about 15 percent higher than under the default rate schedule, with off-peak prices about 20 percent below the default rates. The structure offers the opportunity for consumers to choose to shift heavy-consuming applications like air conditioning and heating to off-peak hours. This could save these consumers money - but it would require them to modify their behavior, invest in new "smart" technology, or both. Will consumers find the opportunity for savings to be worth these changes?
The current enrollment window is open through January 31, 2013.
Labels:
Central Maine Power,
CMP,
energy mix,
real-time pricing,
retail,
smart grid,
time-of-use,
wholesale
FERC seeks demand response standards
Monday, April 23, 2012
Demand response, an innovative strategy to ensuring the integrity of electric grids, is growing in popularity, prompting federal regulators to consider standardizing how demand response performance is measured.
Managing an electric grid entails ensuring a constant balance between electric generation and customer demand for electricity. As customer demand rises, grid operators have traditionally called on more and more generating units. In most markets, grid operators dispatch the lowest-cost units first to keep overall costs down. As a result, generating units needed to meet peak demand tend to be more expensive than baseload generation. Many peaking units also emit more pollutants per unit of energy than baseload units.
In a demand response program, customers can volunteer to be available to reduce their load during times of peak demand. When done right, this reduction in customer demand can play much the same role as dispatching additional generation, but at a lower cost in dollars and environmental impacts. Energy efficiency resources can also play a similar role.
The U.S. Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have both recognized that demand response can be a decentralized, crowd-sourced alternative to peaking power plants. Utilities and regional transmission organizations across the nation are implementing demand response programs.
As demand response grows in importance, the question of how to measure a customer's performance is important. Different utilities and regions have adopted varying standards for how performance is measured. In an attempt to standardize the measurement and verification of demand response and energy efficiency resources participating in organized wholesale electricity markets, the FERC has proposed to amend its regulations to incorporate by reference the demand-side management and energy efficiency business practice standards of the North American Energy Standards Board. NAESB describes itself as "an industry forum for the development and promotion of standards which will lead to a seamless marketplace for wholesale and retail natural gas and electricity, as recognized by its customers, business community, participants, and regulatory entities."
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (29-page PDF), Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 139 FERC ¶ 61,041, FERC states its hope that "[a]doption of these standards is intended to improve the methods and procedures used to accurately measure demand response and energy efficiency resource performance" and that their adoption should help regional grid operators "properly credit demand response and energy efficiency resources for their services".
Managing an electric grid entails ensuring a constant balance between electric generation and customer demand for electricity. As customer demand rises, grid operators have traditionally called on more and more generating units. In most markets, grid operators dispatch the lowest-cost units first to keep overall costs down. As a result, generating units needed to meet peak demand tend to be more expensive than baseload generation. Many peaking units also emit more pollutants per unit of energy than baseload units.
In a demand response program, customers can volunteer to be available to reduce their load during times of peak demand. When done right, this reduction in customer demand can play much the same role as dispatching additional generation, but at a lower cost in dollars and environmental impacts. Energy efficiency resources can also play a similar role.
The U.S. Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have both recognized that demand response can be a decentralized, crowd-sourced alternative to peaking power plants. Utilities and regional transmission organizations across the nation are implementing demand response programs.
As demand response grows in importance, the question of how to measure a customer's performance is important. Different utilities and regions have adopted varying standards for how performance is measured. In an attempt to standardize the measurement and verification of demand response and energy efficiency resources participating in organized wholesale electricity markets, the FERC has proposed to amend its regulations to incorporate by reference the demand-side management and energy efficiency business practice standards of the North American Energy Standards Board. NAESB describes itself as "an industry forum for the development and promotion of standards which will lead to a seamless marketplace for wholesale and retail natural gas and electricity, as recognized by its customers, business community, participants, and regulatory entities."
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (29-page PDF), Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 139 FERC ¶ 61,041, FERC states its hope that "[a]doption of these standards is intended to improve the methods and procedures used to accurately measure demand response and energy efficiency resource performance" and that their adoption should help regional grid operators "properly credit demand response and energy efficiency resources for their services".
March 16, 2011 - victory for demand response
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
The smart grid just got smarter. Demand response -- when customers respond to signals about the scarcity of electricity by temporarily reducing their consumption -- is a key tool in efforts to reduce the cost of energy through the use of smart grid technology. As a society (or as a grid), if we can reduce the peak amount of electricity being demanded, we can not only reduce the need for the most expensive marginal peaking generation units, but we can also reduce the need for expensive transmission lines. Demand response thus benefits not only the person reducing consumption, but also all other ratepayers and the grid as a whole. It is a key component of our transition to a smart grid.
On March 15, 2011, demand response took a big step forward through a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruling on how people should be compensated for demand response participation. In Order No. 745 (116 page PDF), FERC ruled that organized wholesale energy market operators must pay demand response resources the market price for energy, known as the locational marginal price (LMP), when those resources have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource and when dispatch of those resources is cost-effective.
FERC noted that doing so is necessary to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets, something FERC and Congress have promoted across the board. For example, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress established a national policy of eliminating unnecessary barriers to demand response participation. FERC has long held that active participation by customers in organized wholesale energy markets through demand response helps to increase competition in those markets, but had not previously required all organized wholesale markets to compensate demand response resources in the same manner. For example, PJM has been paying the LMP minus the generation and transmission portions of the retail rate, while ISO New England has paid LMP only when prices exceeded a threshold level. Even within a given market, the continual threat of policy changes resulted in a chilling effect on the full implementation and deployment of demand response.
FERC's Order No. 745 takes away this uncertainty. FERC held that demand resources should be paid at market-based prices when two criteria are met: capability and cost-effectiveness. First, the demand resources must have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource. To be paid at market prices, demand resources must be effective at displacing the need for bringing additional generation online. Second, the demand resources must be cost-effective alternatives to generation, based on a "net benefits test". In essence, this test is satisfied when the overall benefit of the reduced energy price resulting from dispatching demand response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources. If both of these criteria are satisfied, organized wholesale energy market operators must pay demand response resources the market price for their energy value.
Demand response has long had great potential to transform the way our power grids work. To reach its full potential, people must be compensated fairly for the value they provide through interrupting their consumption of electricity. With FERC's Order No. 745, that value has been established clearly.
On March 15, 2011, demand response took a big step forward through a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruling on how people should be compensated for demand response participation. In Order No. 745 (116 page PDF), FERC ruled that organized wholesale energy market operators must pay demand response resources the market price for energy, known as the locational marginal price (LMP), when those resources have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource and when dispatch of those resources is cost-effective.
FERC noted that doing so is necessary to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets, something FERC and Congress have promoted across the board. For example, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress established a national policy of eliminating unnecessary barriers to demand response participation. FERC has long held that active participation by customers in organized wholesale energy markets through demand response helps to increase competition in those markets, but had not previously required all organized wholesale markets to compensate demand response resources in the same manner. For example, PJM has been paying the LMP minus the generation and transmission portions of the retail rate, while ISO New England has paid LMP only when prices exceeded a threshold level. Even within a given market, the continual threat of policy changes resulted in a chilling effect on the full implementation and deployment of demand response.
FERC's Order No. 745 takes away this uncertainty. FERC held that demand resources should be paid at market-based prices when two criteria are met: capability and cost-effectiveness. First, the demand resources must have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource. To be paid at market prices, demand resources must be effective at displacing the need for bringing additional generation online. Second, the demand resources must be cost-effective alternatives to generation, based on a "net benefits test". In essence, this test is satisfied when the overall benefit of the reduced energy price resulting from dispatching demand response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources. If both of these criteria are satisfied, organized wholesale energy market operators must pay demand response resources the market price for their energy value.
Demand response has long had great potential to transform the way our power grids work. To reach its full potential, people must be compensated fairly for the value they provide through interrupting their consumption of electricity. With FERC's Order No. 745, that value has been established clearly.
Labels:
alternative energy,
demand response,
energy market,
FERC,
smart grid,
wholesale
December 2, 2010 - a deeper look at the Cape Wind PPA complaint
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Yesterday, the news broke that a group called "Californians for Renewable Energy" (CARE) filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) challenging Cape Wind's power purchase agreement with National Grid. In its complaint, CARE asks FERC to set aside the November 2010 order of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) approving Cape Wind's power purchase agreement with National Grid. CARE also points serious allegations against a variety of parties including National Grid, Cape Wind, and the DPU itself. These allegations range from technical legal points (e.g. that FERC alone has "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of sales for resale of electric energy in interstate commerce by public utilities") to rather disjointed but sensational accusations of connections between wind developers and Italian organized crime.
I've read the Complaint, and this morning, I had a pleasant discussion with Mark Rodgers, Cape Wind's Director of Communications. Mark described CARE's complaint as "baseless", and characterized CARE's allegations of an Italian mafia connection as "false, malicious, and defamatory".
Looking at the Complaint itself, I would personally characterize it as a mix of legal argument and wild conspiracy-theory accusations. On the legal argument side, the Complaint appears to allege that the Massachusetts DPU exceeded its jurisdictional authority in approving the PPA. This argument is based on the recent precedent in which FERC told the California Public Utilities Commission that its feed-in tariff program was invalid because it purported to set wholesale rates for power at the state level. Reasoning by analogy, CARE appears to argue that the DPU improperly set a wholesale rate for power in excess of the utility's avoided cost.
Other legal arguments asserted by CARE strike me as more tenuous. For example, CARE asserts that renewable energy credits (RECs) are "greenhouse gas (GHG) offsets", as well as "a type of energy ancillary service that Mass DPU maintains authority over in regard to the price that is paid wholesale Sellers [sic]". CARE goes on to say, "The REC’s purpose therefore is to offset greenhouse gas emissions by avoidance." This is a troubled argument at best. In general, RECs are distinct from GHG offsets; RECs represent the attributes associated with the generation of energy from state-qualified renewable resources, not the specific amount of GHG emission reductions associated with that generation. RECs exist in compliance markets because state legislatures establish renewable portfolio standards requiring specified amounts of energy to be sourced from renewable resources, and do not generally have an explicit GHG tie-in. Further, REC pricing is generally established through bilateral contracts between parties. While a state utility commission like the DPU does retain authority over utilities in its jurisdiction, state commissions do not necessarily specify the price of RECs.
The second half of the Complaint gets even farther out. In a rambling set of long sentences and quotes from emails sent by CARE and its co-complainant Barbara Durkin, CARE alleges that National Grid and the DPU aided and abetted "fraudulent actions and claims to defraud taxpayers of ARRA stimulus funds". This section, which appears largely to be a rehash of the complainants' earlier position before the DPU, includes a request for FERC to "investigate Cape Wind, National Grid, the Massachusetts Attorney General, and Mass DPU for actions they have taken to aid and abet (act as an accessory to) Cape Wind’s fraudulent actions and claims whose purpose is to defraud taxpayers and ratepayers alike of ARRA stimulus funds". CARE goes so far as to assert that when a National Grid representative said “We have every reason to believe that [the production and investment tax credits] are going to be extended and supported by Congress,” this somehow constituted an admission of a violation of the prohibition on energy market manipulation. (This claim is a real head-scratcher.)
Then, if possible, things get even stranger. CARE devotes 24 pages (nearly the remainder of the complaint) to a series of purported quotes from news media stories and other documents about various wind developers (puzzlingly, including developers other than Cape Wind Associates) and connections to Italian organized crime. I won't bother to recite those allegations further here. Suffice to say that this section of CARE's complaint is wild, disorganized, and fails to effectively illustrate any concrete misdeeds by any of the parties against whom CARE complains.
Clearly, this complaint is sensational. Even trying to read between the lines, it is hard to make sense of many of CARE's claims. While the legal issues regarding whether a state has the authority to approve such a PPA are indeed interesting, particularly in the wake of FERC's restrictions on the California feed-in tariff program, the conspiracy claims tend to detract from CARE's credibility. It will be interesting to see how FERC's review of this complaint proceeds.
I've read the Complaint, and this morning, I had a pleasant discussion with Mark Rodgers, Cape Wind's Director of Communications. Mark described CARE's complaint as "baseless", and characterized CARE's allegations of an Italian mafia connection as "false, malicious, and defamatory".
Looking at the Complaint itself, I would personally characterize it as a mix of legal argument and wild conspiracy-theory accusations. On the legal argument side, the Complaint appears to allege that the Massachusetts DPU exceeded its jurisdictional authority in approving the PPA. This argument is based on the recent precedent in which FERC told the California Public Utilities Commission that its feed-in tariff program was invalid because it purported to set wholesale rates for power at the state level. Reasoning by analogy, CARE appears to argue that the DPU improperly set a wholesale rate for power in excess of the utility's avoided cost.
Other legal arguments asserted by CARE strike me as more tenuous. For example, CARE asserts that renewable energy credits (RECs) are "greenhouse gas (GHG) offsets", as well as "a type of energy ancillary service that Mass DPU maintains authority over in regard to the price that is paid wholesale Sellers [sic]". CARE goes on to say, "The REC’s purpose therefore is to offset greenhouse gas emissions by avoidance." This is a troubled argument at best. In general, RECs are distinct from GHG offsets; RECs represent the attributes associated with the generation of energy from state-qualified renewable resources, not the specific amount of GHG emission reductions associated with that generation. RECs exist in compliance markets because state legislatures establish renewable portfolio standards requiring specified amounts of energy to be sourced from renewable resources, and do not generally have an explicit GHG tie-in. Further, REC pricing is generally established through bilateral contracts between parties. While a state utility commission like the DPU does retain authority over utilities in its jurisdiction, state commissions do not necessarily specify the price of RECs.
The second half of the Complaint gets even farther out. In a rambling set of long sentences and quotes from emails sent by CARE and its co-complainant Barbara Durkin, CARE alleges that National Grid and the DPU aided and abetted "fraudulent actions and claims to defraud taxpayers of ARRA stimulus funds". This section, which appears largely to be a rehash of the complainants' earlier position before the DPU, includes a request for FERC to "investigate Cape Wind, National Grid, the Massachusetts Attorney General, and Mass DPU for actions they have taken to aid and abet (act as an accessory to) Cape Wind’s fraudulent actions and claims whose purpose is to defraud taxpayers and ratepayers alike of ARRA stimulus funds". CARE goes so far as to assert that when a National Grid representative said “We have every reason to believe that [the production and investment tax credits] are going to be extended and supported by Congress,” this somehow constituted an admission of a violation of the prohibition on energy market manipulation. (This claim is a real head-scratcher.)
Then, if possible, things get even stranger. CARE devotes 24 pages (nearly the remainder of the complaint) to a series of purported quotes from news media stories and other documents about various wind developers (puzzlingly, including developers other than Cape Wind Associates) and connections to Italian organized crime. I won't bother to recite those allegations further here. Suffice to say that this section of CARE's complaint is wild, disorganized, and fails to effectively illustrate any concrete misdeeds by any of the parties against whom CARE complains.
Clearly, this complaint is sensational. Even trying to read between the lines, it is hard to make sense of many of CARE's claims. While the legal issues regarding whether a state has the authority to approve such a PPA are indeed interesting, particularly in the wake of FERC's restrictions on the California feed-in tariff program, the conspiracy claims tend to detract from CARE's credibility. It will be interesting to see how FERC's review of this complaint proceeds.
Labels:
avoided cost,
Cape Wind,
FERC,
power purchase agreement,
PPA,
wholesale
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