Electromagnetic pulse and geomagnetic disturbance events "pose a serious threat to the electric grid and its supporting infrastructures that serve our Nation," according to testimony delivered by a federal official to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events are two types of events that could affect the nation's electric grid. Generally speaking, GMD events are naturally occurring solar magnetic disturbances which periodically disrupt the earth’s magnetic field. These disruptions can induce currents on the electric grid that may simultaneously damage or destroy key transformers over a large geographic area.
On February 27, 2019, Joseph
McClellan, director of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
Office of Energy Infrastructure Security, testified before the Senate
committee. As described in his testimony, EMP events can be generated by "devices that range from small, portable, easily concealed battery-powered units all the way through missiles equipped with nuclear warheads." High-altitude nuclear detonations can generate three distinct EMP effects: "a short high energy radio-frequency-type burst called E1 that can destroy electronics; a slightly longer burst that is similar to lightning termed E2; and a final effect termed E3 that is similar in character and effect to GMD, with the potential to damage transformers and other electrical equipment."
According to Director McClellan's testimony, any of these effects could lead to "wide-area blackouts." In his testimony, he cited reports by the federal EMP Commission as finding that "a single EMP attack could seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid," with the potential that significant parts of electric infrastructure could be “out of service for periods measured in months to a year or more."
He also cited a 2010 study by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as finding that "EMP and GMD events pose substantial risk to equipment and operation of the Nation’s electric grid and under extreme conditions could result in major long-term electrical outages," that "GMD disturbances are inevitable with only the timing and magnitude subject to variability," and that a solar storm such as occurred in 1921 "could damage or destroy over 300 bulk power system transformers interrupting service to 130 million people with some outages lasting for a period of years." Director McClellan clarified that subsequent analysis suggested that in case of such an event, "the power grid may collapse before significant damage was done to transformers; resulting in a potentially wide-spread, but relatively short, power outage."
Director McClellan also spoke to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's "dual-fold approach" to address these threats: employing mandatory standards to establish foundational practices while also working collaboratively with industry, the states and federal agencies to identify and promote best practices to mitigate advanced threats. According to a report released in 2018 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. and Canadian electricity suppliers have taken steps to prepare for potential electromagnetic disruptions, but more research is needed on both geomagnetic
disturbances and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses.
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Showing posts with label blackout. Show all posts
Showing posts with label blackout. Show all posts
FERC official testifies on electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances
Friday, March 8, 2019
Feds settle on final 2011 Southwest blackout penalty
Friday, May 29, 2015
Over four years after a major 2011 power outage in Southern California and parts of the Southwest, federal energy regulators have approved the sixth and final settlement of penalties for violations of law and reliability standards.
After the September 8, 2011 blackout left more than 5 million people in Southern California, Arizona and Baja California, Mexico, without power for up to 12 hours, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission began investigating what had happened. After conducting that investigation jointly with electric reliability organization North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), in an April 2012 report FERC found that the outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by utility Arizona Public Service Company tripped.
The FERC continued its investigation into the 2011 Southwest blackout after its staff report was made public. It identified six entities believed to have been involved: Arizona Public Service Company, the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator.
FERC's enforcement process typically offers the accused an opportunity to agree to a stipulation of facts (for example, that the utility violated a particular reliability standard) and to pay a civil penalty and perform mitigation measures. In its enforcement actions related to the 2011 Southwest blackout case, all six entities ultimately agreed to stipulations and penalties that were accepted by the Commission.
In July 2014, the FERC accepted Arizona Public Service's stipulation with NERC and FERC's Office of Enforcement, under which APS agreed to pay $3.25 million and improve its system reliability. In August 2014, California's Imperial Irrigation District agreed to a $12 million fine. Utility Southern California Edison agreed to a $650,000 fine in October. In December, FERC settled with federal power marketing agency Western Area Power Administration with no penalty. Grid operator California ISO agreed to pay $6 million.
This week the FERC announced a settlement with Western Electricity Coordinating Council. WECC promotes grid reliability in the Western Interconnection, a broad area of the western United States. According to the FERC order, FERC enforcement staff and NERC determined that WECC as the Reliability Coordinator violated nine requirements of the Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination (IRO) and the Facilities Design, Connection and Maintenance (FAC) groups of Reliability Standards. Enforcement staff and NERC concluded that WECC failed to identify and prevent violations of system operating limits and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits and was unaware of the impact of protection systems, and used an inadequate system operating limit methodology that exposed its area to cascading outages.
As a result, the settlement calls for WECC to pay a $16 million civil penalty. $3 million of this will be split evenly between the U.S. Treasury and NERC, and $13 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go above and beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the Reliability Standards. WECC and its successor as Reliability Coordinator, Peak Reliability, also agreed to mitigation and reliability activities and to submit to compliance monitoring.
FERC has described the WECC settlement as marking "final resolution" of the investigation by FERC Enforcement staff and NERC into the 2011 Southwest blackout.
After the September 8, 2011 blackout left more than 5 million people in Southern California, Arizona and Baja California, Mexico, without power for up to 12 hours, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission began investigating what had happened. After conducting that investigation jointly with electric reliability organization North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), in an April 2012 report FERC found that the outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by utility Arizona Public Service Company tripped.
The FERC continued its investigation into the 2011 Southwest blackout after its staff report was made public. It identified six entities believed to have been involved: Arizona Public Service Company, the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator.
FERC's enforcement process typically offers the accused an opportunity to agree to a stipulation of facts (for example, that the utility violated a particular reliability standard) and to pay a civil penalty and perform mitigation measures. In its enforcement actions related to the 2011 Southwest blackout case, all six entities ultimately agreed to stipulations and penalties that were accepted by the Commission.
In July 2014, the FERC accepted Arizona Public Service's stipulation with NERC and FERC's Office of Enforcement, under which APS agreed to pay $3.25 million and improve its system reliability. In August 2014, California's Imperial Irrigation District agreed to a $12 million fine. Utility Southern California Edison agreed to a $650,000 fine in October. In December, FERC settled with federal power marketing agency Western Area Power Administration with no penalty. Grid operator California ISO agreed to pay $6 million.
This week the FERC announced a settlement with Western Electricity Coordinating Council. WECC promotes grid reliability in the Western Interconnection, a broad area of the western United States. According to the FERC order, FERC enforcement staff and NERC determined that WECC as the Reliability Coordinator violated nine requirements of the Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination (IRO) and the Facilities Design, Connection and Maintenance (FAC) groups of Reliability Standards. Enforcement staff and NERC concluded that WECC failed to identify and prevent violations of system operating limits and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits and was unaware of the impact of protection systems, and used an inadequate system operating limit methodology that exposed its area to cascading outages.
As a result, the settlement calls for WECC to pay a $16 million civil penalty. $3 million of this will be split evenly between the U.S. Treasury and NERC, and $13 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go above and beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the Reliability Standards. WECC and its successor as Reliability Coordinator, Peak Reliability, also agreed to mitigation and reliability activities and to submit to compliance monitoring.
FERC has described the WECC settlement as marking "final resolution" of the investigation by FERC Enforcement staff and NERC into the 2011 Southwest blackout.
FERC proposes geomagnetic disturbance reliability standard
Thursday, May 14, 2015
Is the U.S. electric grid ready for solar storms and other geomagnetic disturbances? Today the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposed approving a new reliability standard for the grid to address its vulnerability to these hazards.
Periodic activity on the Sun's surface sends powerful waves of energetic particles toward the Earth. These solar events can distort the Earth's magnetic field, affecting the flow of electricity on Earth. While serious geomagnetic disturbances are expected to be infrequent, they can cause blackouts and damage key utility infrastructure.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over the reliability of the U.S.'s bulk electric power system. To this end, it has designated the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the nation's electric reliability organization. In May 2013, FERC directed NERC to develop and submit new standards for protecting the grid against geomagnetic disturbances (Order No. 779).
FERC and NERC have proceeded in a two-stage process. First, in June 2014 FERC approved a standard on implementation of operating plans, procedures and processes to mitigate effects of geomagnetic disturbances (Order No. 797).
Reserved for the second stage were further requirements that transmission planners and owners assess the vulnerability of their systems to a theoretical benchmark event. NERC subsequently proposed such a standard, calling for an evaluation of what would happen in a “one-in-100-year” benchmark event.
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued today, the FERC proposes to largely adopt NERC’s proposed second-stage standard. The standard would require covered entities to have system models needed to complete vulnerability assessments, to have criteria for acceptable steady state voltage performance during a benchmark event, and to complete a vulnerability assessment once every 60 calendar months. If the assessment indicates that a system does not meet the performance requirements, the entity would have to develop a corrective action plan addressing how the requirements will be met.
The proposed rulemaking would direct NERC to further modify its standard to require that the study and benchmarking of geomagnetic disturbance events is based on a more complete set of data and a reasonable scientific and engineering approach.
Comments on today’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are due 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register.
Geomagnetic disturbances, and their impacts to the grid, are a hot topic in energy regulation at the present. States are considering laws regulating utility readiness for and response to geomagnetic disturbances; for example, next week the Maine Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities, and Technology will consider LD 1363, An Act To Secure the Maine Electrical Grid from Long-term Blackouts.
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| A utility substation near Treasureton in southeast Idaho. |
Periodic activity on the Sun's surface sends powerful waves of energetic particles toward the Earth. These solar events can distort the Earth's magnetic field, affecting the flow of electricity on Earth. While serious geomagnetic disturbances are expected to be infrequent, they can cause blackouts and damage key utility infrastructure.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over the reliability of the U.S.'s bulk electric power system. To this end, it has designated the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the nation's electric reliability organization. In May 2013, FERC directed NERC to develop and submit new standards for protecting the grid against geomagnetic disturbances (Order No. 779).
FERC and NERC have proceeded in a two-stage process. First, in June 2014 FERC approved a standard on implementation of operating plans, procedures and processes to mitigate effects of geomagnetic disturbances (Order No. 797).
Reserved for the second stage were further requirements that transmission planners and owners assess the vulnerability of their systems to a theoretical benchmark event. NERC subsequently proposed such a standard, calling for an evaluation of what would happen in a “one-in-100-year” benchmark event.
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued today, the FERC proposes to largely adopt NERC’s proposed second-stage standard. The standard would require covered entities to have system models needed to complete vulnerability assessments, to have criteria for acceptable steady state voltage performance during a benchmark event, and to complete a vulnerability assessment once every 60 calendar months. If the assessment indicates that a system does not meet the performance requirements, the entity would have to develop a corrective action plan addressing how the requirements will be met.
The proposed rulemaking would direct NERC to further modify its standard to require that the study and benchmarking of geomagnetic disturbance events is based on a more complete set of data and a reasonable scientific and engineering approach.
Comments on today’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are due 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register.
Geomagnetic disturbances, and their impacts to the grid, are a hot topic in energy regulation at the present. States are considering laws regulating utility readiness for and response to geomagnetic disturbances; for example, next week the Maine Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities, and Technology will consider LD 1363, An Act To Secure the Maine Electrical Grid from Long-term Blackouts.
4th California blackout FERC enforcement case settles
Friday, December 5, 2014
Federal regulators have approved a settlement with another federal agency over its role in a 2011 blackout in California, Arizona, and Mexico.
On September 8, 2011, the Southwest's electric grid was hit with a widespread power outage that left over 5 million people in California, Arizona and Baja California, Mexico, without power for up to 12 hours. Previous investigations by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) found that the blackout occurred when Arizona Public Service Company's 500-kilovolt Hassayampa-N.Gila transmission line tripped out of service, overloading the remaining elements of the regional grid.
Earlier this year, FERC approved stipulations and consent agreements among its Office of Enforcement, NERC, and three public utilities. Arizona Public Service agreed to pay $3.25 million in civil penalties, California's Imperial Irrigation District agreed to a $12 million settlement, and Southern California Edison Company agreed to pay a $650,000 civil penalty and undertake additional compliance actions.
FERC approved a fourth settlement on November 24, 2014, with the Western Area Power Administration – Desert Southwest Region (Western-DSW). One of four power marketing administrations within the United States Department of Energy, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) markets and transmits electricity to a fifteen-state region from hydroelectric power facilities at the Hoover, Parker, and Davis dams. Western-DSW is one of four regions carrying out this mission for WAPA, serving customers in Arizona, Southern California, and Southern Nevada. It sells more than ten billion kilowatt hours of hydroelectric power to approximately seventy municipalities, cooperatives, federal and state agencies, and irrigation districts. Western-DSW also operates and maintains more than forty substations and 3,100 miles of transmission lines.
In the FERC Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, the Commission notes that Western-DSW violated four Requirements of three Reliability Standards in the Transmission Operations (TOP) and Voltage and Reactive Control (VAR) categories. These groups of standards cover the responsibilities and decision making authority for reliable operations and maintenance of Bulk Power system facilities within voltage and reactive power limits to protect equipment and ensure reliable operation of the interconnection. In particular, FERC Enforcement staff and NERC found that Western-DSW failed to operate its portion of the transmission system within voltage system operating limits and to maintain sufficient situational awareness prior to and during the event, undermining reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Western-DSW stipulated to the facts in the agreement and agreed to implement compliance measures necessary to mitigate the violations and improve overall reliability, including improving its models, better coordination with neighboring entities, and improving its situational awareness by adding a real-time monitoring tool that analyzes and alerts operators to potential contingencies. Western-DSW also agreed to make semi-annual compliance reports to Enforcement staff and NERC for at least one year. Notably, the stipulation does not require Western-DSW to pay a civil penalty.
FERC's general investigative report on the incident identified six potential targets for enforcement action. With cases settled against Western-DSW, SoCal Edison, the Imperial Irrigation District, and Arizona Public Service, only the California Independent System Operator and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator have not yet been parties to a stipulation and consent agreement.
On September 8, 2011, the Southwest's electric grid was hit with a widespread power outage that left over 5 million people in California, Arizona and Baja California, Mexico, without power for up to 12 hours. Previous investigations by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) found that the blackout occurred when Arizona Public Service Company's 500-kilovolt Hassayampa-N.Gila transmission line tripped out of service, overloading the remaining elements of the regional grid.
Earlier this year, FERC approved stipulations and consent agreements among its Office of Enforcement, NERC, and three public utilities. Arizona Public Service agreed to pay $3.25 million in civil penalties, California's Imperial Irrigation District agreed to a $12 million settlement, and Southern California Edison Company agreed to pay a $650,000 civil penalty and undertake additional compliance actions.
FERC approved a fourth settlement on November 24, 2014, with the Western Area Power Administration – Desert Southwest Region (Western-DSW). One of four power marketing administrations within the United States Department of Energy, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) markets and transmits electricity to a fifteen-state region from hydroelectric power facilities at the Hoover, Parker, and Davis dams. Western-DSW is one of four regions carrying out this mission for WAPA, serving customers in Arizona, Southern California, and Southern Nevada. It sells more than ten billion kilowatt hours of hydroelectric power to approximately seventy municipalities, cooperatives, federal and state agencies, and irrigation districts. Western-DSW also operates and maintains more than forty substations and 3,100 miles of transmission lines.
In the FERC Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, the Commission notes that Western-DSW violated four Requirements of three Reliability Standards in the Transmission Operations (TOP) and Voltage and Reactive Control (VAR) categories. These groups of standards cover the responsibilities and decision making authority for reliable operations and maintenance of Bulk Power system facilities within voltage and reactive power limits to protect equipment and ensure reliable operation of the interconnection. In particular, FERC Enforcement staff and NERC found that Western-DSW failed to operate its portion of the transmission system within voltage system operating limits and to maintain sufficient situational awareness prior to and during the event, undermining reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Western-DSW stipulated to the facts in the agreement and agreed to implement compliance measures necessary to mitigate the violations and improve overall reliability, including improving its models, better coordination with neighboring entities, and improving its situational awareness by adding a real-time monitoring tool that analyzes and alerts operators to potential contingencies. Western-DSW also agreed to make semi-annual compliance reports to Enforcement staff and NERC for at least one year. Notably, the stipulation does not require Western-DSW to pay a civil penalty.
FERC's general investigative report on the incident identified six potential targets for enforcement action. With cases settled against Western-DSW, SoCal Edison, the Imperial Irrigation District, and Arizona Public Service, only the California Independent System Operator and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator have not yet been parties to a stipulation and consent agreement.
FERC settles 3rd Southwest blackout case
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
A California public utility has settled claims by federal electricity regulators related to the September 8, 2011, blackout in the southwestern United States. Following an investigation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and electric reliability organization North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Southern California Edison Company has agreed to pay a $650,000 civil penalty and undertake additional compliance actions.
According to previous investigative reports, the 2011 blackout started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by Arizona Public Service Company tripped out of service, causing cascading power outages through automatic load shedding as other equipment quickly overloaded. In the end, the outage affected over 5 million customers, shedding 7,835 megawatts of peak demand and over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy.
Following the blackouts, both FERC and NERC launched investigations into what had happened. As a federal agency, FERC has regulatory authority over the reliability of the electric bulk power system. NERC is a not-for-profit international regulatory authority whose mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America, and has been designated by FERC as the nation's electric reliability organization.
In July, FERC announced a $3.25 million settlement with Arizona Public Service. In August, FERC announced a $12 million settlement with California's Imperial Irrigation District.
Today, FERC announced that it has approved a stipulation and consent agreement between FERC’s Office of Enforcement, NERC, and Southern California Edison Company. Through a joint investigation, FERC Office of Enforcement staff and NERC determined that the utility violated the Protection and Control group of NERC's Reliability Standards. In particular, the investigation found that Southern California Edison failed to adequately coordinate its intertie separation scheme at the San Onofre nuclear generating station switchyard with certain other protection systems. Enforcement staff and NERC found this violation to be a serious deficiency that undermined reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Through the settlement, Southern California Edison will pay a civil penalty of $650,000. Of this penalty, $125,000 will be paid to the U.S. Treasury, $125,000 will be paid to NERC, and $400,000 will be invested in additional reliability enhancement measures.
With Southern California Edison's case resolved, all three of the vertically integrated utilities known to be implicated by FERC's investigation have now settled their alleged violations by agreeing to pay penalties. Will further penalties be forthcoming? Will the penalties and ordered reliability measures keep the lights on the next time the grid is stressed?
According to previous investigative reports, the 2011 blackout started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by Arizona Public Service Company tripped out of service, causing cascading power outages through automatic load shedding as other equipment quickly overloaded. In the end, the outage affected over 5 million customers, shedding 7,835 megawatts of peak demand and over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy.
Following the blackouts, both FERC and NERC launched investigations into what had happened. As a federal agency, FERC has regulatory authority over the reliability of the electric bulk power system. NERC is a not-for-profit international regulatory authority whose mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America, and has been designated by FERC as the nation's electric reliability organization.
In July, FERC announced a $3.25 million settlement with Arizona Public Service. In August, FERC announced a $12 million settlement with California's Imperial Irrigation District.
Today, FERC announced that it has approved a stipulation and consent agreement between FERC’s Office of Enforcement, NERC, and Southern California Edison Company. Through a joint investigation, FERC Office of Enforcement staff and NERC determined that the utility violated the Protection and Control group of NERC's Reliability Standards. In particular, the investigation found that Southern California Edison failed to adequately coordinate its intertie separation scheme at the San Onofre nuclear generating station switchyard with certain other protection systems. Enforcement staff and NERC found this violation to be a serious deficiency that undermined reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Through the settlement, Southern California Edison will pay a civil penalty of $650,000. Of this penalty, $125,000 will be paid to the U.S. Treasury, $125,000 will be paid to NERC, and $400,000 will be invested in additional reliability enhancement measures.
With Southern California Edison's case resolved, all three of the vertically integrated utilities known to be implicated by FERC's investigation have now settled their alleged violations by agreeing to pay penalties. Will further penalties be forthcoming? Will the penalties and ordered reliability measures keep the lights on the next time the grid is stressed?
FERC approves second Southwest blackout penalty
Thursday, August 7, 2014
A California irrigation district has agreed to pay a $12 million penalty to settle its role in a 2011 power outage affecting over 5 million people in California, Arizona, and Mexico.
The September 8, 2011 outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by Arizona Public Service Company tripped out of service, causing cascading power outages through automatic load shedding as other equipment quickly overloaded. In the end, the outage deprived customers of 7,835 megawatts of peak demand and over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy.
Swiftly on the heels of the outage, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and electric reliability organization NERC launched an investigation into what had happened -- and whether any laws or regulations had been violated. That investigation focused on APS and five other entities believed to have been involved: the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator. Last month, the Commission approved a $3.25 million settlement with APS.
Today, the Commission issued an order approving a stipulation and consent agreement resolving Imperial Irrigation District's role in the blackout. Imperial Irrigation District is a not-for-profit, publicly owned, vertically integrated utility and political subdivision of the State of California. The sixth largest utility in California, Imperial Irrigation District Electricity provides electric power to more than 145,000 customers in the Imperial Valley and parts of Riverside and San Diego counties.
Through their investigation, Commission enforcement staff and NERC found Imperial Irrigation District violated 10 requirements of four Reliability Standards on transmission operations and transmission planning, including a failure to coordinate its operations planning with neighboring systems. The Commission noted that these violations were serious deficiencies that undermined reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Through that stipulation, Imperial Irrigation District agreed to pay a civil penalty of $12 million. Of this amount, at least $1.5 million will go to the U.S. Treasury and another $1.5 million will go to NERC, and at least another $9 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the mandatory Reliability Standards. These reliability enhancements will include construction of one or more utility-scale battery energy storage facilities within IID’s transmission operations area, with the money spent by December 31, 2016.
Two of the six entities known to be targeted by the Commission's investigation have now settled their alleged violations by agreeing to pay penalties. Perhaps more significantly, APS and Imperial Irrigation District represent two of the three vertically integrated utilities implicated. Will the FERC/NERC investigation lead to further settlements soon? What impact will the Imperial Irrigation District settlement and penalty agreement have?
The September 8, 2011 outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by Arizona Public Service Company tripped out of service, causing cascading power outages through automatic load shedding as other equipment quickly overloaded. In the end, the outage deprived customers of 7,835 megawatts of peak demand and over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy.
Swiftly on the heels of the outage, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and electric reliability organization NERC launched an investigation into what had happened -- and whether any laws or regulations had been violated. That investigation focused on APS and five other entities believed to have been involved: the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator. Last month, the Commission approved a $3.25 million settlement with APS.
Today, the Commission issued an order approving a stipulation and consent agreement resolving Imperial Irrigation District's role in the blackout. Imperial Irrigation District is a not-for-profit, publicly owned, vertically integrated utility and political subdivision of the State of California. The sixth largest utility in California, Imperial Irrigation District Electricity provides electric power to more than 145,000 customers in the Imperial Valley and parts of Riverside and San Diego counties.
Through their investigation, Commission enforcement staff and NERC found Imperial Irrigation District violated 10 requirements of four Reliability Standards on transmission operations and transmission planning, including a failure to coordinate its operations planning with neighboring systems. The Commission noted that these violations were serious deficiencies that undermined reliable operation of the Bulk Power System.
Through that stipulation, Imperial Irrigation District agreed to pay a civil penalty of $12 million. Of this amount, at least $1.5 million will go to the U.S. Treasury and another $1.5 million will go to NERC, and at least another $9 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the mandatory Reliability Standards. These reliability enhancements will include construction of one or more utility-scale battery energy storage facilities within IID’s transmission operations area, with the money spent by December 31, 2016.
Two of the six entities known to be targeted by the Commission's investigation have now settled their alleged violations by agreeing to pay penalties. Perhaps more significantly, APS and Imperial Irrigation District represent two of the three vertically integrated utilities implicated. Will the FERC/NERC investigation lead to further settlements soon? What impact will the Imperial Irrigation District settlement and penalty agreement have?
Arizona utility fined $3.25 million over 2011 blackout
Friday, July 11, 2014
On a hot summer afternoon in 2011, cascading power outages spread across the North American Southwest. Over 5 million people in Southern California -- including all of San Diego -- Arizona and Mexico were left without power for up to 12 hours. This week a federal investigation into the outage was partially resolved by a $3.25 million settlement with Arizona Public Service Company.
According to a joint report by the staffs of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the September 8, 2011 outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by APS tripped. The Hassayampa - N. Gila line serves as a major transmission corridor that transports power in an east-west direction, from generators in Arizona into the San Diego area. The line's failure triggered significant voltage deviations and equipment overloads, causing transformers, transmission lines, and generating units to trip offline through automatic load shedding. In all, 7,835 megawatts of customer load lost power -- over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy -- primarily in the San Diego Gas and Electric service territory and in Baja California.
Following the outages, both the Commission's Office of Enforcement and NERC launched an investigation into the incident. That investigation, which has been ongoing since 2011, focused on APS and five other entities believed to have been involved: the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator.
The investigation concluded that APS had violated NERC's mandatory Reliability Standards. APS's role and liability was ultimately resolved this week when the Commission accepted a stipulation between APS, the Commission's Office of Enforcement and NERC.
Through that stipulation, APS agreed to pay a civil penalty of $3.25 million. Of this amount, $1 million will go to the U.S. Treasury, $1 million will go to NERC, and $1.25 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the mandatory Reliability Standards. In finding the settlement to be in the public interest, the Commission cited APS's cooperation in the investigation as well as its voluntary mitigation efforts.
With APS's role in the outage settled, joint FERC/NERC investigations into other entities' roles continue. While some targets of investigation choose to settle their cases, others insist to exercise their full legal rights. Will the 2011 Southwest blackouts lead to further stipulations and penalties?
According to a joint report by the staffs of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the September 8, 2011 outage started when a 500-kilovolt transmission line owned by APS tripped. The Hassayampa - N. Gila line serves as a major transmission corridor that transports power in an east-west direction, from generators in Arizona into the San Diego area. The line's failure triggered significant voltage deviations and equipment overloads, causing transformers, transmission lines, and generating units to trip offline through automatic load shedding. In all, 7,835 megawatts of customer load lost power -- over 30,000 megawatt-hours of energy -- primarily in the San Diego Gas and Electric service territory and in Baja California.
Following the outages, both the Commission's Office of Enforcement and NERC launched an investigation into the incident. That investigation, which has been ongoing since 2011, focused on APS and five other entities believed to have been involved: the California Independent System Operator, the Imperial Irrigation District, Southern California Edison, the Western Area Power Administration, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Coordinator.
The investigation concluded that APS had violated NERC's mandatory Reliability Standards. APS's role and liability was ultimately resolved this week when the Commission accepted a stipulation between APS, the Commission's Office of Enforcement and NERC.
Through that stipulation, APS agreed to pay a civil penalty of $3.25 million. Of this amount, $1 million will go to the U.S. Treasury, $1 million will go to NERC, and $1.25 million will be invested in reliability enhancement measures that go beyond mitigation of the violations and the requirements of the mandatory Reliability Standards. In finding the settlement to be in the public interest, the Commission cited APS's cooperation in the investigation as well as its voluntary mitigation efforts.
With APS's role in the outage settled, joint FERC/NERC investigations into other entities' roles continue. While some targets of investigation choose to settle their cases, others insist to exercise their full legal rights. Will the 2011 Southwest blackouts lead to further stipulations and penalties?
Electricity and natural gas market links
Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Concerns over the increasing interdependence of natural gas and electricity markets in the United States have prompted federal regulators to schedule a series of technical conferences on the subject for next month.
In recent years, natural gas has increased its share of the energy mix used to generate electricity. Usage of coal, historically the dominant fuel used to generate electricity, is declining, while natural gas pricing is historically low. This shift to increased reliance on natural gas is also driven in part by the growth of intermittent renewable energy resources like wind which may need natural gas to back them up when the wind isn't blowing.
At the same time, investigations into the blackouts and reliability problems like those affecting Texas and the Southwest in February of 2011 suggest that a lack of coordination between the electricity and gas industries may be partly responsible for the outages.
On February 3, 2012, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Commissioner Philip Moeller issued a letter posing a series of questions concerning gas-electric interdependence. His questions included what role the FERC should play in overseeing better coordination between the two industries, what regional differences might affect this coordination, and differences in how electricity and gas are traded in their respective markets.
In response to Commissioner Moeller's letter, a variety of stakeholders submitted comments. Many commenters suggested that significant regional differences exist in both how markets operate and how their coordination could be improved.
As a result, the FERC has scheduled a series of regionally-oriented technical conferences for August:
In recent years, natural gas has increased its share of the energy mix used to generate electricity. Usage of coal, historically the dominant fuel used to generate electricity, is declining, while natural gas pricing is historically low. This shift to increased reliance on natural gas is also driven in part by the growth of intermittent renewable energy resources like wind which may need natural gas to back them up when the wind isn't blowing.
At the same time, investigations into the blackouts and reliability problems like those affecting Texas and the Southwest in February of 2011 suggest that a lack of coordination between the electricity and gas industries may be partly responsible for the outages.
On February 3, 2012, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Commissioner Philip Moeller issued a letter posing a series of questions concerning gas-electric interdependence. His questions included what role the FERC should play in overseeing better coordination between the two industries, what regional differences might affect this coordination, and differences in how electricity and gas are traded in their respective markets.
In response to Commissioner Moeller's letter, a variety of stakeholders submitted comments. Many commenters suggested that significant regional differences exist in both how markets operate and how their coordination could be improved.
As a result, the FERC has scheduled a series of regionally-oriented technical conferences for August:
- Central (generally the areas controlled by Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator Inc. (MISO), Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)), to be held August 6, 2012, in St. Louis, MO
- Northeast (generally the area controlled by ISO New England, Inc.), to be held August 20, 2012, in Boston, MA
- Southeast (generally the areas controlled by Southern Company, Duke and Progress Energy, TVA, as well as other areas south of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and East of SPP and ERCOT), to be held August 23, 2012, at FERC headquarters in Washington, DC
- West (generally the Western Interconnection), to be held August 28, 2012, in Portland, OR
- Mid-Atlantic (generally the areas controlled by New York Independent System Operator Inc. (NYISO), PJM and related areas), to be held August 30, 2012, at FERC headquarters in Washington, DC
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