U.S. energy regulators have denied a petition by a Nevada electric utility that would have rejected a regulatory filing by a local power plant. The ruling preserves the power plant's ability to sell electricity to its host utility.
The case centers on Saguaro Power Company, owner and operator of a 105 megawatt topping-cycle cogeneration facility in Henderson, Nevada. The plant sells electricity to Nevada Power Company under a power purchase agreement. Under that PPA, the energy and capacity rates paid by Nevada Power to Saguaro would be reduced by 20 percent if Saguaro loses its status as a "qualifying facility" or QF under federal law.
Since 1978, qualifying facilities have been entitled to receive certain benefits under the federal law called PURPA, but the process and requirements for becoming a QF have changed over time. Prior to August 8, 2005, in order to be a QF, a cogeneration facility was required to “produce electric energy and forms of useful thermal output (such as heat or steam), used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes, through the sequential use of energy” and meet the applicable operating and efficiency standards. Since then, EPAct 2005 and Order No. 671 have provided that any “new” cogeneration facilities, i.e., a cogeneration facility that was either not certified as a QF on or before August 8, 2005 or had not filed a notice of self-certification or Commission application for certification prior to February 2, 2006, must also demonstrate that the “thermal energy output... is used in a productive and beneficial manner.”
In December 2017, Saguaro filed a Form No. 556 recertifying its facility as an existing cogeneration QF. That filing identified new thermal hosts who will receive thermal energy in the form of distilled water from the facility’s low pressure steam output, replacing thermal hosts previously identified in a prior self-recertification filing.
But Nevada Power Company filed a petition for declaratory order with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, asserting that Saguaro's self-recertification filing was deficient. Specifically, the utility argued that Saguaro failed to demonstrate its compliance with the operating and efficiency standards -- and also that the facility should be treated as "new" and thus be subject to additional standards under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Commission's Order No. 671, such as whether the facility is being used in a productive and beneficial manner.
The Commission has rejected Nevada Power's petition. In its order denying Nevada Power's petition, the Commission noted that its Order No. 671 establishes a rebuttable presumption that an existing QF does not become a "new cogeneration facility" merely because it files for recertification, and that Saguaro represented having made no changes to its facility. The Commission concluded that filing for recertification to identify new replacement thermal hosts did not make the Saguaro facility "new."
Showing posts with label QF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label QF. Show all posts
FERC declares QF rights
Thursday, August 4, 2016
Federal energy regulators have issued an advisory opinion regarding the rights of Qualifying Facility electric generators to sell power to their local utility under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's declaratory ruling illustrates how the Commission interprets PURPA and QF rights, in the context of state renewable energy portfolio standards and
PURPA was enacted by Congress in 1978 to promote goals including energy conservation and greater production of domestic and renewable energy. It established a new class of generating facilities called QFs, to receive special rate and regulatory treatment. A chief benefit of QF status is the
right to sell energy and capacity to a utility, usually at either at the utility's avoided cost or at a negotiated rate. By regulation, QFs generally have the option to sell energy either "as-available," or as part of a long-term contract or other legally enforceable obligation for delivery of energy or capacity over a specified term.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees this program, although state energy commissions play important roles. Section 210 (H)(2)(A) and (B) of PURPA give the Commission discretionary power to enforce its PURPA rules, including the power to require state commissions and non-regulated utilities to comply. But the Commission may also decline to initiate an enforcement action, on a case by case basis.
Earlier this year, a group of QFs filed a complaint to the Commission against the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority. Windham Solar LLC and Allco Finance Limited alleged that Connecticut law and PURA’s regulations violate the Commission's PURPA regulations regarding an electric utility’s mandatory purchase obligation and a QF’s ability to sell pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation. Complainants effectively alleged that they couldn’t get a long-term contract to sell energy and capacity at avoided cost rates on a forecasted basis, unless the energy and capacity were bundled with renewable energy certificates (RECs), or unless the energy and capacity were provided under a short-term contract not to exceed one year.
Some of those basic facts were contested by PURA and others, and the Commission noted a history of dispute and litigation among the complainants and Connecticut energy regulators. So the Commission declined to initiate an enforcement action on the complaint.
But the Commission did issue a declaratory ruling, reciting case law and interpretation on two points: the relationship between state RECs and PURPA, and QF opportunities to secure long-term contracts. The Commission noted that RECs exist under state law and not PURPA, but that avoided cost contracts do not automatically include RECs. It also noted that winning a competitive solicitation cannot be the only way a QF may be allowed to obtain long-term avoided cost rates.
The original comes with robust citations to precedent, omitted for convenience below:
PURPA was enacted by Congress in 1978 to promote goals including energy conservation and greater production of domestic and renewable energy. It established a new class of generating facilities called QFs, to receive special rate and regulatory treatment. A chief benefit of QF status is the
right to sell energy and capacity to a utility, usually at either at the utility's avoided cost or at a negotiated rate. By regulation, QFs generally have the option to sell energy either "as-available," or as part of a long-term contract or other legally enforceable obligation for delivery of energy or capacity over a specified term.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees this program, although state energy commissions play important roles. Section 210 (H)(2)(A) and (B) of PURPA give the Commission discretionary power to enforce its PURPA rules, including the power to require state commissions and non-regulated utilities to comply. But the Commission may also decline to initiate an enforcement action, on a case by case basis.
Earlier this year, a group of QFs filed a complaint to the Commission against the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority. Windham Solar LLC and Allco Finance Limited alleged that Connecticut law and PURA’s regulations violate the Commission's PURPA regulations regarding an electric utility’s mandatory purchase obligation and a QF’s ability to sell pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation. Complainants effectively alleged that they couldn’t get a long-term contract to sell energy and capacity at avoided cost rates on a forecasted basis, unless the energy and capacity were bundled with renewable energy certificates (RECs), or unless the energy and capacity were provided under a short-term contract not to exceed one year.
Some of those basic facts were contested by PURA and others, and the Commission noted a history of dispute and litigation among the complainants and Connecticut energy regulators. So the Commission declined to initiate an enforcement action on the complaint.
But the Commission did issue a declaratory ruling, reciting case law and interpretation on two points: the relationship between state RECs and PURPA, and QF opportunities to secure long-term contracts. The Commission noted that RECs exist under state law and not PURPA, but that avoided cost contracts do not automatically include RECs. It also noted that winning a competitive solicitation cannot be the only way a QF may be allowed to obtain long-term avoided cost rates.
The original comes with robust citations to precedent, omitted for convenience below:
4. The Commission has previously addressed issues regarding the relationship between state-created RECs and PURPA. The Commission has stated that the states have the authority to determine who owns RECs in the initial instance and how they are transferred, and has explained that the automatic transfer of RECs within a sale of power at wholesale must find its authority in state law, not PURPA. The Commission has also held, however, that a state regulatory authority may not assign ownership of RECs to utilities based on a logic that the avoided cost rates in PURPA contracts already compensate QFs for RECs in addition to compensating QFs for energy and capacity, because the avoided cost rates are, in fact, compensation just for energy and capacity. Moreover, while the Commission has made clear that states have the authority to regulate RECs, states cannot impede a QF’s ability to sell its output to an electric utility pursuant to PURPA. Thus, regardless of whether a QF has previously sold its RECs under a separate contract, that QF has the right to sell its output pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation.As noted in the declaratory ruling, the Commission's "decision not to initiate an enforcement action means that Petitioners may themselves bring an enforcement action against the Connecticut Authority in the appropriate court."
5. The Commission has also held that “requiring a QF to win a competitive solicitation as a condition to obtaining a long-term contract imposes an unreasonable obstacle to obtaining a legally enforceable obligation.” The Commission likewise has determined a state regulation to be inconsistent with PURPA and the Commission’s PURPA regulations “to the extent that it offers the competitive solicitation process as the only means by which a QF . . . can obtain long-term avoided cost rates.” Accordingly, regardless of whether a QF has participated in a request for proposal, that QF has the right to obtain a legally enforceable obligation.
Labels:
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June 10, 2011 - Idaho restricts wind/solar incentive
Friday, June 10, 2011
Regulators in Idaho have restricted an incentive for certain small wind and solar projects, but renewable projects can still qualify for the right to sell their power to utilities. At its heart, the issue is an old one: who should pay for renewable development, and how much should they pay.
The federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) authorizes FERC to require utilities to purchase power from renewable “qualifying facilities”. Under PURPA, utilities must sign contracts with qualifying facilities to buy their output at a rate capped at the utility's "avoided cost", or marginal cost to produce the next incremental kilowatt-hour.
Because utilities’ avoided costs are typically set based on the default fleet of generators, a qualifying facility cannot use PURPA to receive a price premium over the marginal conventional resource. However, having the right to require a utility to buy your power is a valuable incentive for developing a renewable project.
Each state sets the avoided cost rates for its own qualifying facilities. In Idaho, large generators have to negotiate individual avoided cost rates with utilities. To help smaller qualifying facilities, projects smaller than a specified threshold don’t have to negotiate, but can sell power to utilities at “published” avoided cost rates which are generally more favorable for project developers.
Where that threshold is set affects who can qualify for those published rates. Originally, facilities whose average output was 10 MW or smaller qualified for the published rates. However, utilities complained to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, asking for the threshold to be lowered to 100 kW. Utilities complained that ratepayers should not have to bear above-market costs, particularly not costs in excess of the actual avoided cost limit set by PURPA. Commenters also complained about large projects trying to circumvent the threshold by characterizing themselves as a series of smaller projects in order to qualify for the incentive. At the end of 2010, the Commission temporarily reduced the threshold to 100 kW for wind and solar resources, leaving it at 10 aMW for other resources.
This week, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission has issued an order (Order No. 23362, 10 page PDF) leaving the lowered 100 kW threshold for wind and solar in place. The Commission noted that it would be "illegal pursuant to PURPA" to allow large projects to obtain a rate that does not accurately reflect the utility's avoided cost. As a result, Idaho wind and solar projects' right to sell power at the more favorable published avoided cost rates is now limited to projects smaller than 100 kW. Larger projects can still avail themselves of negotiated avoided cost rates.
Labels:
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